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ary drafts of certain sections have been written. 
The following specific comments are made regarding various phases of t he 
study .. 
Legal Problem 0f Outdoor Advertising Control. 
The dBvelopment of the law through precedent in state and federal 
courts has been examined in primary and secondary sourceso Special library 
research has been done on the development of releva nt legal concepts i n the 
Georgia ·courtso This work is almost completed. 
Sta te Statutes on Outdoor Advertising. 
An examination has been made of the practices of t he various states 
i n the control of outdoor advertising. This survey has i ncluded regu l atio ns 
prior to the adoption of the National Standards and regulations enacted i n 
co nformLty with the National Standards. 
The National Standards. 
A careful examination of the National Standards has been made to 
clarify their precise meaning and the implications for any legislation t ha t 
might be passed in Georgia. 
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l ater than December 1, 1962o 
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, INTRODUCTJ:ON 
Control of outdoor advertising has long been of concern to state, county, 
and municipal governments. Statutes and ordinances related to this activity 
have been common since early in this century. In the mid-1950's Congress took 
under consideration the advisability of control of outdoor advertising along the 
Interstate Highway System. It was felt by many that this unique network, 
41,000 miles -in length and connecting 90 per cent of the major urban centers, 
is essentially national in character and that the federal government should 
take the lead in encouraging uniform regulations designed to promote the safety, 
beauty, and maximum usefulness of the System. 
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 is the result of this concern by 
Congress. Essentially it provides for a uniform system of control of outdoor 
advertising through voluntary adoption by the states of a set of billboard 
standards under federal encouragement. These standards include minimum spacing 
provisions and a limitation on the number, size, and types of billboards. The 
law establishes an incentive payment amounting to one half of one per cent of 
the cost of the Interstate Highway for those states entering into an agreement 
to abide by the National Standards promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce under 
the authority of the act. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the feasibility of the adoption and 
implementation of the National Standards along the Interstate Highway System 
within the State of Georgia. The report is divided into four parts: 
l. An examination of state regulation of outdoor advertising before 
and after the National Standards; 
2. A legal analysis of outdoor advertising control; 
-ii-
). A financial analysis of outdoor advertising control; and 
4. Conclusions and recommendations. 
-iii-
I. STATE REGULATION OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE NATIONAL STANDARDS 
state Regulations Prior To 1958 
At the time of the passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 a 
sizable body of legislation existed qealing with billboard regulation on 
a state level. Every state had some form of legislation appl ying to out -
door advertising in 1958, although in some cases it constituted a bar e 
minimum. The almost infinite variety in these statutes makes them cumber~ 
some to summarize but the more common provisions will be outlinedel* 
Sixteen states, including our sister states of Alabama, Florida, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee, required a license to engage in the 
business of outdoor advertising. Nineteen states required permit s f or 
outdoor signs. Fifteen states provided for a protected area measured 
by a specific distance in feet from the highway within which certain regu-
lations applied. This varied from a distance of ·l5 feet, as in -Florida, 
to a length of 750 feet in Vermont. In about half of the states these 
distances applied to all public roads or highways. In the other half 
they applied to expressways, parkways, or specifically identified drivese 
Four states had spacing requirements. Only Oregon had detailed restric-
tions. New Mexico and Vermont had provisions "directed at eliminating 
a row or series of signs advertising the same article or business."2 
Virginia had a statute dealing with billboards near an interchange on a 
controlled access route. 
Protected area and spacing provisions represent the stricter forms 
* " Superscript numbers refer to citations listed at the back of this reporto 
l 
of billboard control. A number of other miscellaneous regulat ions are 
I 
commonly found. About tw·o-thirds of the states prohibited signs obstruct~ 
ing vision in one w·ay or another and signs resembling offic i al markers .. 
About a third of the states regulated structural specifications. A number 
of states had laws prohibiting such _things as signs advertising illegal 
activities and signs w·i th flashing lights. 
Georgia Billboard Law'S 
In a survey of state statutes in 1958 the I l linois Legislative Counci l 
divided all states into tw·o groups: states having more than mini mal 
regulation and those w·i th minimal billboard legislat i on.. Stat es fal ling 
into the first group w·ere so classified on the basis that "they have 
enacted either considerable amounts of legislation, or some one parti cu-
larly intensive control on the subject."3 The states divide themselves 
about equally into the tw·o groups. 4 Georgia is classified as having 
only uminimal regulation." Among our sister states, Alabama, Floridap 
and Tennessee were classified as having more than minimal control s .. 
Briefly Georgia law·s forbid the imitation of official signs or 
signs designating railroad crossings, signs placed on the right-of-way 
of public roads, the placement of a sign on private propert y w·ithout 
the consent of the owner, and signs obstructing the view· t o any portion 
of a public road. The exact wording is as follow·s: 
"No person shall ·place, maintain, or display upon or i n 
view· of any highw·ay any unauthorized sign,- signalp marking)) or 
device which purports to be or is an imitation of or resembl es an 
official traffic-control device or railroad s i gn or any r a ilroad 
sign or signal. • • • Every such prohibited signp signal, or -
marking is hereby declared to be a public nuisance and the aut hor i t y 
having jurisdiction over the highway is hereby empowered to remove 
the same or cause it to be removed without notice." (Code .? Sec .. 68-1616) 
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"It shall be unlaw·ful to erect signs or any obstructions of 
any kind upon the right-of-way of any State highway, except those 
signs or obstructions as may be erected by authority of 
the State Highway Department .... 11 (Code, Sec. 95-609) 
11There shall be no signs of any description whatsoever 
erected or maintained w·ithin the right-of-way lines of the public 
roads of this State, exc~1Jt route markers, direction or warning 
signs which may be erect®d by or at the instance of the public 
road officials of this State, which officials shall include the 
State Highway Board and its representatives and the various 
coQnty officials having charge of all public roads not included 
in the State-aid system. 11 (Code, Sec. 95-2002) 
"No person, firm, or corporation shall mar or deface, or 
in any way damage, any sign erected by the public road author ities 
as provided in the preceding section. " (Code , 95 .... 2003) 
"No person, fir111, or corporation shall erect, affix , maintain, 
or cause to be erected, affixed, or maintained any sign in imita-
tion of or in the form of the road signs erected by public officials 
as provided in section 95-2002 .. " (Code, 95c.>2004) 
v'No person, firm, or corporation shall erect.? affix.)' or maintain 
any sign, device, or advertisement upon any private propert y 
w·i thout w·ri tten permission /of the owner or lessee of said private 
property, or of the agent of such owner or lessee. (Sec ., 95-2005 ) 
uNo advertising sign, device, or display shall be erected.? 
affixed, or maintained in any place or position where it obstructs 
a clear view· from any public road in this State to any other 
portion of the said public road. Where any such s i gn.? devi ce, or 
display shall be erected, affixed, or maintained in a pl a ce or 
position where it so obstructs the view· of such public road or 
roads, the official or officials in charge of such publie road 
may order the removal of such sign or device by writ t en notice 
to the party or parties so erecting, affixing, or maintaining; 
and if such party or parties shall not remove such sign or 
device within 30 days after such order of removal, such public 
official or officials may cause such s i gn or device to be 
removed; and the expense of such removal may be collected from 
the party or parties owning or controlling such devi ce or, display, 
in an action based on this provision ~nd Chapter .. " (Code, Sec., 
95-2006) 
Georgia Municipal and County Ordin~nces 
Sign and outdoor display regulations are quite common among Georgia 
cities. These are usually simple and limited in number.. Protection of 
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districts zoned residential is w·idespread •. Typically the only signs allowed 
are identifying nameplates, usually limited to one or two square feet in 
size, and signs in connection w·i th the sale, lease, or rental of real 
estate, limited in size to eight or nine square feet. 5 Most ordinances 
place no limitations, or practically none, on signs in districts zoned 
commercial or industrial. Setback provisions for all signs or certain 
classes of signs are rather common. A few· cities have a rather complete 
set of rules. A proposed zoning ordinance for Chatham County•SavruLnah, for 
example, has provisions regarding sight obstruction, signs that could be 
confused w·i th traffic signals, w·ind pressure intensity specifications, 
size limitation, and the spacing of signs along the side of the street. 6 
As far as counties are concerned the General Planning and Zoning 
Enabling Act of 1957 should be mentioned.7 A feature of this Act impor-
tant to this study is the provision for planning and zoning in areas 
500 feet wide on either side of any State or county highway. 8 Of all the 
counties through which the Interstate System passes, only Lowndes County~f 
as far as could be determined, has any provision for control of billboards 
along the Interstate. The specific wording of the ordinance is as follows: 
"Separate use signs designed or placed to be seen princi-
pally from the travelled roadway of Interstate 75 shall be at 
least ten (10) feet from the right-of-way and no closer than 
one-thousand (1000) feet to another sign on the same side of 
the road, or to any entrance or exit ramp. Except that the 
Board of Appeals is authorized to grant a variance upon finding 
that a particular piece of property had less than one-thousand 
(1000) feet of frontage remaining in one ownership at the time 
of acquisition for right-of-way by the Highway Department and 
that the location of existing signs renders it impossible to 
maintain a spacing of one-thousand (1000) feet betw·een signs • . 
In no case, how·ever, shall a variance be authorized which w·ou ~rl 
place any sign nearer than one~thousand (1000) feet from any 
entrance or exit ramp."9 
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The Federal-Aid Highw·ay Act of 1958 
Introduction: The Interstate Highway System. The Federal Govern= 
ment first entered into a nationw·ide cooperative plan of highway improve= 
ment w·i th the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916. The current report of the 
Georgia Highway Department says: 
uA vital feature of the first Act was that the Federal 
Govern.ment was '.. .. • authorized to cooperate w·i th the States 
through their respective State highway departments ••• ' Since 
the Federal Highw·ay Act of 1921 there has been a continuation 
of the cooperative Federal~aid Plan with initiati ve in the 
selection of the systems and the selection of projects resting 
w·i t h the State highw·ay departments.. The roads on the several 
Federal-aid highw·ay systems are under the jurisdiction and con= 
trol of the State or its political subdivis ions and there are 
no Federal highways except those in Federal lands. ulO 
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 authorized t he National System 
of Interstate and Defense Highways, the most recent achievement in state.,. 
federal cooperation . Designed for speeds up to 70 miles per hour, w·i th 
controlled access along its entire length_, the Interstate Higbw·ay is 
meant to be the backbone of the nation '- s highway system. Marked with 
the legend "I nterstate" a..nd carr ying the sa-me number for the full length 
) 
of the route through several States or across the entire country, i t is, 
in the f ullest sense of the term, a unified national highway o 
"It connects, as directly as practicable , the principal 
metropolitan areas, cities, a..nd industrial centers , serves the 
natiGnal defense, and connects w·i th routes of continental 
importance in Canada and Mexico 0 I t w·ill link together 90 
per cent of the cities having populations of 50,000ror more, as well 
as many smaller cities and towns.. It w·ill servt=; well over half 
of the rur.al population of the United States. vi 11 
In 1957 it was estimated to cost $700,000 a mileo 12 Among our nation's 
roads it is unique in character. 
When completed approximately 1,108 miles of the Inter state System 
will be in Georgia. As of July 1, 1962, 139 miles were finished and 
5 
Figure 1. National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. 
SOURCE: Bureau of Public Roods 
Figure 2. National System of Interstate and Defense Highways in Georgi a . 
TENNESSEE NORTH CAROLINA 
TO 
FLORIDA 
SOURCE: Georgia Highway Department 
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under traffic. On the same date there were 16,478 mil es of highway of all 
types in the State highway network. The planned total mileage of I nter-
state represents, therefore, about 7 per cent of the total mi les of State 
highways. 
Background of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 
Because of the Interstate's unique charact er as a system that repre-
sents a unified whole -- a network crossing many political jurisdictions --
\ 
interest was early expressed in Congress in a billboard control program t o 
be created and implemented with the voluntary cooperation of the states 
in the tradition of the federal-state highway relationship. The thinking 
of the advocates of such a program is summarized by the Honorable Si nclair 
Weeks, the then Secretary of Commerce: 
"The Congress has already recognized that t he movement 
of motor vehicles rapidly, efficiently, pleasantlyJ and safely 
on the Interstate System depends not only upon what happens on 
the highway but also in the roadside areas, by requiring that 
the right-of-way of the system be adequate to permit construction 
of projects up to the geometric and construction standards; 
that access points not be added without the prior approval of 
the Secretary of Commerce; and that service stations or other 
commercial establishments serving motorists be kept off the right-
of-way. Establishment of a national policy with respect to 
the control of advertising adjacent to the Interstate System 
would only be a further recognition by the Congress of t his fact."l3 
The first federal legislation to control bil lboards was proposed 
by Senator Gore in 1955.14 This bill did not receive Congressional 
approval. Legislative interest was revived by the efforts of Senators Gore 
and Neuberger in 1957. Public hearings were held for eight daysol5 Even 
a superficial review of the transcript of these hearings immediately 
suggests the intensity of feelings generated by the billboard contra-
versy. 
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Prominent among the supporters of this legislation were the nation's 
local and federated garden clubs and the various automobile associations; 
opposing it were the organized outdoor advertising industry and various 
roadside groups including restaurant and motel associationso uThe lobby-
ing activities carried on by the various interests would furnish excellent 
material for a study of pressure group tactics. 
ul6 Legislation failed 
to pass in 1957, but in 1958 the first nationw·ide, federally~sponsored bill 
on outdoor advertising control was adopted by both houses and signed by 
President Eisenhower on April 16, 1958.17 
Interested Parties. Among the signs that appear at roadsides are 
. h fl 11 18 those that m1g t be termed random • These are posters, frequently 
irregular in shape and amateurish in design, that are erected by individ-
uals who are not specialists in highw·ay promotion 0 This category of signs 
is usually the most difficult to policeD 
The professionally designed billboard, w·ith which t he highway travel ... 
er is familiar, is the product of a highly organized industry . 19 Its or-
ganizational structure has been summarized as follow·s: 
11The most widely known organization is the Out door 
Advertising Association of America, Inc., trade associat ion 
of the industry, which has been instrumental in developing 
standardized practises, facilities and structureso The OoAoA.Ao 
has instituted studies in several leading universities on the 
effective placement of advertising and on w·ind pressure. 0 0 • 
Seven hundred and seventy-six companies, or approximately ninety-
five per cent of the industry, belong to the O .• A.A.,A. 
"Outdoor Advertising Incorporated, which is owned and 
supported by a · large majority of the outdoor advertising companies, 
is the national sales and promotion organization for the industry. 
In addition to a main office in New· York City~ OoAoio maintains -
eleven branch offices in other principal citieso 
rrThe National Outdoor Advertising Bureau)) Inc., a non-profit 
cooperative organization, is owned by a number of ·leading advertising 
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agencies. Its function is to sublet national coverage contracts to 
the member companies throughout the country and, by means of f ield 
representatives, to assure the proper fulfillment of the contracts. 
"The Traffic Audit Bureau, Inc., is sponsored jointly by the 
o.A.A.A., the Association of ·National Advertisers, Inc.J and 
the American Association of Advertising Agencies. This bureau 
furnishes ' traffic surveys to advertising companies so that they 
w·ill be able to know· the 'circulation' of their billboards 0 
"These four organizations have elevated the position of 
the billboard from an instrument of local display to an im~ 
portant element in a nationw'ide advertising campaign. ''20 
Though representatives of the industry testified at the public hear= 
ings in 1957 "that outdoor advertising, at least by the organized outdoor 
advertisers, constitutes something less than 2 per cent by dollar volume 
of the expenditures for advertising in the United States,u2l at the same 
time, total industry sales are substantial. These were estimated to be 
in excess of $200 million in 1956. 22 In 1961 the industry's ten largest 
national accounts - including firms like General Motors Corporation and 
the Coca-Cola Company- were reported to total almost $35 milliono 23 The 
outdoor , advertising industry sells "coverage 11 rather than space. The a~ 
mount of traffic passing a sign and the number of travelers seeing the 
display are measures of its value. This being the case, the industry can 
~/ 
hardly be indifferent to regulation of billboards on the Interstate System 
with its high volume of traffic. 
Local businesses directly serving the traveling publ ic, especially 
motels and restaurants, depend to an unusual degree on outdoor adver-
tising for promotion. The very nature of their operation makes it impos-
sible to use advertising media - radio, television, newspapers ~ avail-
able to other types of business. Billboards on the highway or signs 
on the premises are the only point of contact between the f irm and its 
10 
specialized market, highway traffic. The National Standards promulgat ed 
under the authority of Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 give recognition 
to this problem by restricting the use of the spaces allow·ed on the In-
terstate System to economic activities situated w·i thi n a twelve mile 
radius of the billboard location. 
Provisions of the Act 
Section 12 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 bears the title 
"Areas Adjacent to the Interstate System" and sets forth the policy of 
I 
the government with respect to advertising displays along t hese highways. 
The express .. purpose of the controls envisioned in the legislation is 
contained in the follow·ing excerpt from the law·. 
"To promote the safety, convenience, and enjoyment of 
public travel and the free flow· of interstate commerce and 
to protect the public investment in the National System of 
Interstate and Defense Highways, it is hereby declared to be 
in the public interest to encour§ge and assist the States 
to control the use of and to improve areas adjacent to the In-
terstate System by controlling the erection and maintenance 
of outdoor advert~sing signs, displays, and devices adjacent 
to that system. "24 
It might be emphasized that the federal law· does not in and of itself 
establish a system of control upon the use of outdoor advertising a l ong 
the Interstate System; this decision rests solely w·ith the individual 
states • . The purpose of the federal statute is to encourage the states to 
undertake such measures and to assure that some degree of uniformity 
is achieved should the states decide to do soo 
Consistent w·i th the purpose stated above, and in a more specific 
vein, the act continues w·i th a declaration of the national policy regard-
the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising deviceso 
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"It is hereby declared to be a national -policy that the 
erection and maintenance of outdoor adver,t :i. sing signs, di splays, 
or devices · w·i thin six hundred and sixty feet of the edge of 
the right-of-way and visible from the main-traveled way of a l l 
portions of the Interstate System constructed upon any par t of 
right-of-way, the entire width of which is acquired subsequent 
to July 1, 1956, should be regulated.ll consistent w·i th national 
standards to be prepared and promulgated by the Secretar y (of 
) "25 Commerce • • • 
Two observations m~y be made at this pointo .Fi rst, the choice of 
a protected area 660 feet in -width on either s i de of the right-of-wa y i s , 
of course, to some ext.ent arbitrary. How·ever, those states which had pre-
viously instituted advertising controls had established a protected ar ea 
which varied w·idely up to a figure of 750 feet. The choice of 660 feet""'""' 
one-eighth of a mile--is a compromise, a di stance which is ea s ily mea sured 
on engineering maps. Second, any portion of t he I nt er stat e System which 
is built upon right-of-way acquired prior to J uly lJ 1956, is specifi.,. 
cally excluded from the operation of the National Standards relating 
to outdoor advertising. In Georgia, approxLmately 43 miles of a total of 
1,108 fall w·i thin this category. This provision of the law· appears to 
be re~ated to the f&ct that direct participation by t he feder a l govern-
ment in the construction of the Interstate System dat es from the passage 
of the Federal-Aid Highw·ay Act of 1956-... which wa s approved on June 29 J 
1956. 
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 cont i nued by specifying the 
types of signs which could be placed w·i thin the area of cont rol . These 
permissible signs fall w'ithin four categor i es. 
(1) Directional or other official signs or notices that 
are required or authorized by law·. 
(2) Signs advertising the sale or lease of t he property upon 
which they are located. 
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(3) Signs erected or maintained pursuant to authorization 
or permitted under state law, and not inconsistent with the national 
policy and standards of this section, advertising activities 
being conducted at a location w·i thin twelve miles of the point at 
which such signs are located. 
(4) Signs erected or maintained pursuant to authorization 
in state law· and not inconsistent w·ith the national policy and 
standards of this section, and designed to give in6ormation 
in the specific interest of the traveling public .. 2 
The necessity for Class 1 signs is obvious and their description is 
self-explanatory. Brief comments, however, W'ill be made regarding 
the description of the remaining three classes of signs. 
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 defines Class 2 signs as those 
"advertising the sale or lease of the property upon which they are 
located." This definition has been expanded, however, in the National 
Standards or Code of Federal Regulations as actually drawn up by the 
Secretary of Commerce. 27 In addition to the type of sign sanctioned in 
the law, the National Standards include all "on premiseu signs with-
in the group of Class 2 signs. Class 2 signs are defined therein as, 
"Signs not prohibited by state law· which are consistent 
w·ith the applicable provisions of this section and Section 20.,8 
and which advertise the sale or lease of, or activities being 
conducted upon, the real property where the signs are located. 11 28 
Thus the category of Class 2 signs includes the advertisement of activities 
being conducted upon the property upon which the sign is located in addi-
tion to signs announcing the sale or lease of that property. 
Probably the majority of all existing outdoor advertising signs W'ill 
fall w·ithin the categories of Class 3 and Class 4.. The description of 
permissible signs within both of these groupings is so w·orded as to give 
recognition to the fact that some states have already enacted legislation 
13 
which prohibits certain forms or methods of outdoor advertising. The 
description of Class 3 signs, how·ever, is particularly restrictive o 
Both the Act and the National Standards promulgated thereunder define 
Class 3 signs as those advertising activities which are conducted with-
in a radius of tw·elve miles of the location of the signo 
This stipulation has far-reaching implications:; and considerable 
controversy has arisen over it. Its effect w·ould be to exclude in some 
instances, and seriously restrict in others:; the advertisement of brand-
name merchandise. Thus while containing an element of discrimination:; 
it may also be argued that this provision nevertheless assures that the 
available advertising locations w·ill be assigned to those business 
firms most irmnediately concerned w·i th achieving contact w·i th the public 
traversing that particular section of highway, namely, motels:; restaurants, 
and automotive service facilities. 
This cormnent is appropriate also in the case of Class 4 signs-~ 
those "designed to give information in the specific interest of the 
traveling public." Therefore it is important to note that neither the 
Federal-Aid Highw·ay Act of 1958 nor the National Standards which have 
been promulgated under its authority actually contemplate a prohibition 
of outdoor advertising along the Interstate System. Rather they speci~ 
fically reserve this privilege to those individuals and business firms 
whose interest is most closely tied to the motoring public. 
As noted previously, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 authorized 
the Secretary of Commerce to draw· up a code of regulations regarding 
the control of outdoor advertising along the Interstate System. These 
National Standards are reproduced in an appendix to this report, but a 
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brief description of certain of their major provisions w·ill be inserted 
at this point. 
The National Standards repeat some of the material included i n t he 
law· itself, particular].~ those provisions relating to t he pur pose a.n.d 
intent of the regulations and the four classes of permissible s i gns , 
topics which have been discussed above. They also include a secti on 
setting forth explicit definitions of the terms used in the Act and in 
the Standards themselves. In additon the Standards prescribe certai n 
requirements relating to the spacing of signs, their size limitations, 
their physical characteristics, the use of trade~names, and the use of 
"informational sites" which are optional at the discretion of the indi v i d ... 
ual states. Each of these latter i terns w·ill be discussed briefly 0 
Spacing. The National Standards set forth a detailed specification 
of spacing requirements to be observed in the l ocation of outdoor adver~ 
tising signs. Essentially these specifications relate to the clasifi-
cation of sign under consideration and to the proximity of a particular 
stretch of highway to an interchange. For example, no Class 3 or Cla ss 
4 signs are to be permitted w'i thin tw·o miles of an exit roadway 0 The 
rationale fd~ this restriction would seem to be that this area should be 
reserved for directional signs (Class 1) and that any other signs might 
possibly lead to confusion or distraction on the part of the motoristo 
Again, on stretches of the highway more than five mi les removed from an 
exit roadway, an average of one sign .per mile is permitted. In terms 
of a traffic flow· of t)O miles per hour, this requirement w·ould allow· 
the motorist to be confronted w·i th an advertising sign not more often than 
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once every minute. Undoubtedly the concept of driver-distraction as 
it relates to highw·ay safety is pertinent in this instance o 
Size Limitations. The Standards restrict the size of Class 3 and 
Class 4 signs to an area not to exceed 150 square feet, w·ith a limita"" 
tion of 20 feet in length, w·idth, or height, including border and trim. 
Class 2 ("on premise") signs are also subject to this limitation except 
when located no more than 50 feet from the activity which they advertise. 
The purpose of the size limitation appears to be the prevention of ex-
ceptionally large signs, although the exemption of certain Class 2 signs 
is to some extent arbitrary. 
Physical Characteristics. The National Standards prescribe certain 
physical characteristics to be observed in the case of Class 2~ Class 3~ 
and Class 4 signs. These include restrictions w·i th respect to lighting 
and a specific prohibition of signs which utilize moving parts}) signs 
nailed to trees or painted upon rocks, signs which obscure the vision 
of the motorist in connection w·i th ~pproaching or merging traffic~ 
signs which block a view· of official or directional signs~ and signs 
which imitate or resemble official traffic signs or devices. A number 
of states already have legislation in force which is consistent in subC2 . 
stance w·i th these provisions. 
Use of Trade-names. The effect of the National Standards upon 
the advertisement of brand-name merchandise was noted previously .. . Actual-
ly the Standards do not impose an outright ban on the use of trade-names, 
but they do restrict their use considerably. The Standards specifi- , 
cally exempt Class 2 signs located w·i thin 50 feet of the activity adver= 
tised thereon from any restirction on the use of trade-names. However all 
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Class 2 signs located further than 50 feet from the advertised activi ty 
and all Class 3 signs are subject to such a restriction. A business 
firm, for example, which qualifies for a sign under the Class 3 category 
(i.e., a firm located no more than twelve air miles from the sign) may use 
a trade-name in its advertisement, but only if the name of t he business 
firm is displayed as conspcuously as the trade~name also appearing on the 
sign. On the other hand, a firm which qualifies to erect a sign under t he 
Class 4 category (signs in the specific interest of the traveling public) 
may use a trade-name subject to no relative size limitation, provided 
the trade name itself qualifies as one associated with the interest of 
the traveling public (e.g., a gasoline brand-name). All other types of 
trade-names are prohibited in the Class ·4 sign categoryo Thus it can be 
seen that the advertisement of brand-name merchandise is not prohibited 
per ~; rather the advertisement of such merchandise is subordi nat ed to 
the advertisement of the activities of those firms actually conducting 
business within the immediate vicinity of the highway and those which 
handle brand-name merchandise which is directly related to the mot oring 
needs of the public. 
Informational Sites. The National Standards provide that the States, 
at their discretion, may construct what are known as 11 informat i onal sit es," 
areas adjacent to the highway and in which a large multi~panel signboard 
may be erecte-d providing space for a great number of Class 3 and Class 4 
signs. Such signs are not to be visible from the highway itself; the 
motorist must actuallly leave the highway and enter an enclosed area from 
which the signs may be seen. The use of these informational sites is 
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subject to considerable controversy. Those who advocate the construction 
of such sites point to the fact that they solve one of the major problems 
involved in space allocation, the problem of how to deal equitably with 
a situation in which there are more eligible advertisers than spaces 
available along the highway. Critics of the device, however, advance 
the hypothesis that few motorists are willing to leave the main-traveled 
highway in order to see what may be found in an informational site and that 
the dangers which m~y lurk in such areas at night tend to destroy their 
po-ssible usefulness. Prior to making any specific recommendation on this 
point, it may be worthwhile to point out that the decision of whether 
or not to construct such sites rests solely with the states. Informa~ 
tional sites are not mandatory under the National Standards. 
The intent of the preceding discussion of the National Standards 
has not been to provide a comprehensive analysis of their provisions 
but rather to reveal their objective ~Dd to indicate certain of the 
specific means by which they seek to attain it. The Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1958 authorized the Secretary of Commerce, not only to 
draft such Standards, but also to enter into agreements with the highway 
departments of the various States whereby .these Standards were to be enforced. 
Any such agreement, as noted earlier in this section, does not apply to 
those portions of the Interstate System which are to be constructed upon 
right-of-way acquired prior to July l, 1956. The Act of 1958 also 
provided that, 
"Upon application of the State, any such agreement may, 
within the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce, consistent 
with the national policy, provide for excluding from applica~ 
tion of the national standards segments of the Interstate System 
which traverse incorporated · mQ~icipalities wherein the use of 
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real property adjacent to the Interstate System is subject to 
municipal regulation or control, or which traverse other areas 
where the land use is clearly established by State law as in-
dustrial or commercial ••• "29 
The Act was amended in 1959 to remove the element of discretion. This sec-
tion of the law now reads as follows: 
"Agreements entered into between the Secretary of Commerce 
and State highway departments under this section shall not apply 
to those segments of the Interstate System which traverse commercial 
or industrial zones within the presently existing boundaries 
of incorporated municipalities wherin the use of real property 
adjacent to the Interstate System is subject to municipal 
regulation or control, or which traverse other areas where the 
land use, as of the date of approval of this Act (September 21, 
1959), is clearly established by State law as industrial or com-
mercial ••• "30 
Therefore any agreement between the Secretary of Co~merce and a state high-
way department calling for the acceptance and enforcement of the National 
Standards does not apply to those segments of the Interstate System 
which (l) are constructed upon right-of-way acquired prior to July 1, 
1956, (2) traverse areas which have been zoned as commercial or industrial 
and which lie within the presently existing boundaries of incorporated 
municipalities having such zoning authority, and (3) traverse other areas 
in which the State has clearly established land use as industrial or 
commercial. 
In order to induce the states to enter into agreements with the 
Secretary of eommerce calling for the enforcement of the National Standards, 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958 provided that the federal share of the 
total cost of construction be increased from 90 to 90.5 per cent -- applicable 
only to those segments of the Interstate System subject to the operation 
of the National Standards. Should the state incur additional costs in im-
Plementing the Standards, such as the purchase of advertising easement s , 
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the additional expenses are to be treated as part of the total cost of 
construction and are subject to the 90-10 division, provided that federal 
reimbursement to the state shall be made only with respect to that portion 
of such cost which does not exceed 5 per cent of the cost of the right-
of-way for the project. These latter costs are not eligible f or the addi-
tional half of one per cent from the federal government, howevero3l 
The additional half of one per cent is to be paid from the general 
funds of the Treasury and not from the Highway Trust Fund. It is of in-
terest to note that the Department of Commerce Appropriations Act for 196332 
contains an appropriation of 2 million for bonus payments to these . states 
which have entered into agreements with the Secretary of Commerce to control 
outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the Interstate System. The pre-sent 
deadline for entering into these agreements is June 30, 1963.33 
Adoption of the National Standards by the States 
At.·the time of this writing sixteen states have signed contracts 
with the Secretary of Commerce agreeing to adopt the National Standards. 
The sixteen states are: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsino Since it is the purpose 
of the Highway Act of 1958 to bring about a uniform policy with regard to 
advertising on the Interstate Syste, it is not surprising that the regula~ 
tions adopted by the sixteen states are basically alike. For the most 
part the states have simply drafted the detailed National Standards into 
law with regard to the classification of signs, depth of the protected 
area, and spacing. However, nothing prevents a state from passing stricter 
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regulations than those provided for in the federal standards; in addition, 
no provision is made for uniformity in administration. Consequently there 
is a considerable diversity in the provisions of the sixteen states in this 
regard. Some of the more important details are here summarized. 
Administrative Agency. Responsibility for administration is typi-
cally assigned to the state highway department. In a few cases a specific 
division within the department is also designated. In Ohio, for example, 
it is the Division of Right-of-Way. In two states responsibility is not 
assigned to the highway department. In Oregon the administrative agency 
is the Bureau of Labor; in Vermont, the Secretary of State. 
Purchase of Advertising Rights. Six states make provision for the 
purchase of easements. They are: Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania . 
. Depth of Protected Area. All states must protect the roadside area 
to a distance of 660 feet. Vermont has extended this to 750 feet. Five 
states apply the 660 feet rule to all controlled-access highways, whether 
in the Interstate System or not. A sixth state, Maine, has a 500 feet rule 
for turnpikes not a part of the Interstate. 
Information Sites. Only five states provide for the erection of 
information sites. 
Permits, Tags, Licenses. Almost all of the states (12) require 
a permit to be obtained before a sign is erected. In all cases it is 
effective for only one year. For the most part the other four states do 
not require a permit simply because they do not allow Class 3 and 4 signs 
at all. Vermont is an example. Seven states require an identification 
tag to be placed on the sign. This usually has printed on it the number 
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of the permit and the name of the person or firm erecting the sign. Seven 
states also require an outdoor advertising firm operating within the state 
to obtain a license. 
Inspection System. The majority of states do not provide for a formal 
inspection system. Apparently it is simply assumed that district maintenance 
engineers will report billboard violations as a normal part of their duties. 
Two states, Maryland and Nebraska, require district engineers to make an 
inventory of all signs every three months and to file a formal report. 
Ohio has a detailed plan for reporting violations through organizational 
channels. 
Pehaltiesi , Almost all of the states provide for a penalty for 
violations. This consists of a fine or imprisonment or both. In only 
one case, Ohio, is the maximum fine in excess of $500. The median fine 
is roughly in the range of not less than $25 and not more than $500. 
Fewer states provide for imprisonment and the median penalty is for one-
to-three months. 
Nonconforming Use. Only two states allow in their statutes and 
regulations for a period of tolerance for the purpose of amortization of 
the billboard investment. Kentucy and Oregon allow a five year period 
for signs constructed prior to a specified date. However, it is a 
standard procedure for the contract between the state and the Depart-
ment of ~ommerce to allow signs erected prior to July 1, 1961--the original 
~ 
deadline for participation in the national program--to remain for three 
years, that is, until July 1, 1964. Presumably for contracts signed under 
"the ne~ deadline, June 30, 1963, the toleration period will end on July l, 
1966. 
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Method of Allocating Spaces. One of the really difficult problems 
p 
of administration is to devise a plan for allocating a limited number of 
spaces in an equitable way. Only three states make formal provision for 
this in their regulations. Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin provide 
that a permit for an eligible sign location shall be issued to the first 
applicant to submit a satisfactory application. Oregon and Washington, 
however, give first preference in the granting of permits for Class III 
and IV signs to state, county, municipal, and federal agencies. 
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II. PROBLEMS OF REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
l!_ltroduction 
Whatever one's feelings about the desirability of signs along the 
public highway, it must be recognized that the legal problems of regula~ 
tion are complex and their solution uncertain. A practica l objection to 
outdoor advertising does not necessarily constitute a legal objectiono 
In the history of the regulation of the industry the most difficult 
problem has been to find a basis for control that will meet the test of 
constitutionality. The state, attempting to regulate advertising in the 
public interest, presses against the claims of abutting landowners and 
the advertising industry. A half-century of decisions reflects the effort 
of the courts to maintain a proper balance betwwen the rights of individuals 
having an interest in outdoor advertising and the claims of the general 
public. 
Organized outdoor advertising, though subject, like any business, 
to regulation, is recognized as a legitimate business. As such, it can 
rightfully expect to be protected against unreasonable restriction. In 
addition any legislation regulating billboards that repr.esents more than 
minimal control extends the area of regulation beyond the state-owned right~ 
of-way. The National Standards, as promulgated by the Department of 
Commerce under the authority of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958J speci~ 
fically provides for an area of control 660 feet to eit her side of the 
right-of-way. Regulation is extended to the land of abutting ownerso 
Real property law, then, becomes a crucial matter in the question of such 
regulation. 
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outdoor Advertising and ~roperty Rights 
A survey of court decisions indicates that the position of the abutterJ 
in terms of precise legal definition, is not completely clear. Early de-
cisions refer to the advertising right as a propert y right.34 Clearly the 
advertising right is based, in the first instance , on the right of the 
owner to do with his p~operty whatever he chooses. In addition it is 
related to the right of visibility, the right to be seen from adjacent 
property. This is only one of several, clearly established rights inc i den-
tal to ownership of real property adjacent to the public road. Others 
include right of access, light, and air. These rights of the abutting 
landowner are so fundamental that they have their .roots in common l awo 
As one opinion has stated: 
"There are ••• two classes of rights , originating in 
necessity and in the exigencies of human affairs ~ springing 
up coeval with every public highway, and which are recognized 
and enforced by the common law of all civil ized nationso The 
first relates to public passage, the second, subordinate to t he 
first, but equally perfect and scarcely less importnat, relates 
to the adjoining owners. Among the latter is that of receiving 
from the public highway light and aire 
"In the first place, has not the adjacent owner upon the 
• ordinary public highway, of common right the privilege 
of receiving from it light and air? Universal usage is common 
law. What has this been? Men do not first build cities, and 
then lay out roads through them but they first lay out roads , 
and then cities spring up along their lineso As a matter of 
fact and history, have not all villages, towns and citi es 
in this country and in all other, now and in all times past, 
been built upon this assumed right of adjacency? ••• It 
is a right founded on such urgent necessity that all laws and 
legal proceedings take it for grantede"35 
In the language of real property the right of visibility is an 
easement.36 An easement has been defined as a right in the owner of 
one parcel of land, by reason of such ownership, to use the land of 
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another for a special purpose not inconsistent with a general property in 
the owner.37 Again it has been defined as a liberty~ privilege, or advan~ 
tage without profit, which the owner of one parcel of land may have in the 
f th 38 In discussions of easements the expressions "dominant lands o ano er. 
estate" and "servient estate" appear. As the terms suggest, the former is 
the estate having a claim against another; the latter, the estate against 
which the claim exists. In the terminology of easements the public road 
is the servient estate burdened with the easement of visibilityo The 
owner of land adjacent to the highway cannot be regulated in the use of 
his land regarding advertising, if this involves a 11 taking" of his property 
rights, in the legal sense of the term, without due regard to the consti·tu~ 
ti6nar ·. protection contained in the due process clauses. 
One argument suggested for a legal defense of regulation begins with 
the fundamental question of whether or not such regulation does, in fact, 
violate property rights when the law of easements is applied to the matter.39 
There are two general types of easements, easements appurtenant and ease-
ment in gross. The former is appurtenant to the land. It represents a 
claim which one estate, the dominant estate, has on another, the servient 
estate. It is an incorporeal right, a hereditament; it adheres in the 
land. An easement in gross represents a claLm held by a person against 
land. In this case there is no dominant estate, only a servient estate. 
An easement appurtenant is irrevocably such and cannot be changed to an 
easement in gross.40 Also it is clear that an easement appurtenant can 
only be used in connection with the dominant estate.41 An example of 
this last mentioned characteristic of easements appurtenant is presented 
in Chase v Cram 42 In this case the court ruled that the right to take --· --· 
26 
water, ''as occasion may require," from adjoining property pertained 
onlY to the use of the water on the dominant estate and that bottling the 
water for sale was not permitted. 
It is argued that the right of visibility is clearly an easement 
appurtenant. Since such an easement operates for the benefit of the 
dominant estate there is no doubt that a property owner has the right to 
promote, through advertising, activities engaged in on the dominant estate. 
However, since an easement appurtenant cannot be separated from the land 
or transferred to another for a '"use other than that to which the dominant 
estate itself is dedicated, there is no constitutional right protecting 
billboards promoting activities not conducted on the abutting land. This 
reasoning has been summarized as follows: 
"An easement necessarily constitutes a burden on the 
servient estate. Use for the benefit of the dominant estate 
is the lawful limit of that burden -- in the absense of any 
other and stricter limitation ••• The right of visibility 
is then one of the rights that the law gives in order to promote 
the development and improvement of land bordering on public 
ways. It is a right appurtenant to such land, apart from which 
it cannot be owned and for the benefit of which alone it can 
be lawfully exercised."43 
Only the Supreme Court of Vermont has accepted this line of reason-
ing.44 In that case the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute 
prohibiting billboards within 240 feet of the highway on the basis that 
the advertising right is not t_rans_ferabl.~. Other courts have chosen to 
ignore this thesis. It has also been specifically rejectedo45 It is 
probable that Vermont will remain the exception in denying the right of 
property owners to lease land for advertising purposes. The Federal-
Aid Higqway Act of 1958, itself, "gives implied recognition to the existence 
of the advertising right by allowing federal funds to be used for the 
PUrchase of advertising rights."46 
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Accepting, then, the recognition by most courts of the right to lease 
l&ld for advertising along the road as a legitimate property rightj there 
are two ways in which a state could proceed in a program of control. It 
could purchase advertising easements from the owners of the strips of land 
to be controlled along the right-ofcaway .and engage in condemnation proceed-
ings under the right of eminent domain. Or it could regulate advertising 
within the area of control desired by exercise of the state's police 
power vithout compensatio-n to abutting landownerso It is the latter method 
that is more frequently used by states and the one that requires a thorough 
discussion. 
Outdoor Advertising and the Police Power 
The right of private pnoperty is not an absolute one; it can be 
regulated for the good of society. The power to regulate is based on the 
police power. When regulation is necessary for the promotion of public 
health, safety, morals, comfort and the general welfare, individual rights 
must give way and the owner is not entitled to compensation. The usual 
procedure in outdoor advertising regt~a·tion is to declare the offending 
signs to be a nuisance and subject to removal. Although the police 
power must be balanced against individual rights, for example, private 
property and freedom of speech, it is a broad power and to be interpreted 
as such. It is dynamic in its application. 
"Since the police power is based on public necessity it 
is not limited to conditions as they exist at any one particular 
time, and it is capable of expanding or contracting to accord 
with increased or decreased needs on the part of the public in 
particular spheres of regulation."47 
Nevertheless exercise of this power must meet the criteria for valid appli-
cation, the necessity of the general welfare. If the police power is 
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exercised without the general welfare, in fact, requiring it, then the 
I 
regulation involves a restriction of property without due precess of law 
II k• II •th t • t t• or a ta 1ng ~l ou JUS compensa 1on. Whether or not the facts .of 
the case show that the purposes for which the police power is invoked are 
met in reality is a matter subject to judicial review. The crux of most 
cases involving the control of outdoor advertising has been just this; 
do the regulations represent a control necessary for the public health, 
safety, morals, comfort, and the general welfare, and, therefore» a valid 
exercise of the police power; or do they represent a case in which the 
necessity of the public welfare proclaimed is fictional and in whichJ there~ 
fore, the enforcement is an invalid exercise of the police power ~Dd a 
violation of constitutional rights? 
The development of the law has been in the direction away from a . 
stringent and narrow· interpretation of the police power to the acceptance 
of a broader basis for the upholding of legislation controlling outdoor 
advertising. This development has been uneven across the various juris-
dictions in the country and the definitive opinion has yet to be giveno 
The earliest cases arose in connection w·ith municipal regulations before 
intensive use of highways became common. In these early decisions ordi-
nances against unsafe structures were upheld but the courts declared regula-
tlon that went beyond this to be unconstitutional. Specifically courts re-
fused t o recognize aesthetics as a valid basis for the exercise of the 
Police power.48 The traditional reasoning of the courts in refusing to 
recognize aesthetics as a _proper basis is reflected in Passaic Vo Paterscn, 49 
an opinion much quoted in later cases: 
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''Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and 
indulgence rather than necessity, and it is necessity alone 
which justifies the exercise of the police power to take 
private property without compensation." 
St. Louis Gunning Co. ~· St. Louis5° is a landmark in billboard 
decisions in that it broadened the basis for regulation and set criteria 
for valid billboard control. The ordinance in question did not forbid 
billboards entirely but regulated the dimensions~ distance from the 
ground, and setback from the street. City officials argued that bill boards 
were being used as hiding places for robbers and persons engaged in illicit 
acts, that they were a cause of the collection of debri s, and a source of 
unsanitary conditions and offensive odors. The court accepted 
the existence of such conditions and upheld the ordinance on the basis of 
safety, morality, and sanitation. Succeeding courts, reluctant to reject 
the precedence regarding aesthetics set by earlier decisions, looked to 
the broad criteria established in the St. Louis Gunning Co. case for 
upholding billboard control legislation. On this basis regulations regard~ 
ing location, distance from street and highway, and size have been approved 
by courts.5l The requirement that outdoor advertisers obtain a license52 
and a permit to construct advertising structures ,, has also been approvedo 53 
Aesthetics and Recent Decisions. At the same time a substantial 
view has been developing giving open recognition to aesthetics as a 
valid basis for regulation. Thus in the General Outdoor Advertising Coo 
!· Indianapolis54 case, the court stated: 
"Under a liberalized construction of the general welfare 
purposes of State and Federal Constitutions there is a trend 
in the modern decisions (which we approve) to foster under 
the police power, an aesthetic and cultural side of munici-
pal development -- to prevent a thing that offends the sense of 
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sight in the same manner as a thing that offends the sense of 
hearing and smelling.'' 
In some decisions this has involved a recognition of aesthetics for exer-
cise of the police power only when combined with other considerations.55 
But there is also a growing minority view which considers aesthetics, 
as such, a proper basis.56 In Hav-a-Tampa Cigar Co. ~· J ohnson 9 57 Chief 
Judge Brown of the Florida Supreme Court stated in a concurring opinion: 
"I think the time has come to make a candid avowal of 
the right of the legislature to adopt appropriate legislation 
based on these so-called aesthetic but really very practi-
cal grounds." 
In a subsequent case, Merritt~· Peters,58 this view was adopted by 
the entire court. In this case a zoning ordinance restricting the size 
of signs was upheld • . The Florida Supreme Court specifically held that 
factors of health, safety and morals did not form a reasonable basis 
for the restriction but that protection of the beauty of the community 
did. The Court of Kansas reflected similar thin~ing: 
"Has the time not come, or at least is it not almost .~ here,)) 
when the courts will drop the mask of an exclusive concern for 
safety and health that in the case of billboards is not real, 
and frankly approve reasonable regulation of the use of property 
in the interest of beauty?"59 
In this connection the statement of Justice Douglas in Berman Vo 
Parker60 is interesting. ~pe case involved condemnation of land in the 
District of Columbia in a redevelopment programo Plaintiffs held that 
:property was included that was not blighted or dangerous and that property 
owners were being unnecessarily deprived of their lando In his opinion 
Justice Douglas stated: 
"The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive o o • 
The values it represents are spiritual as well:as physical_, 
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of t he 
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legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful 
as well as healthy • If those who govern the District of 
columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful 
as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth amendment 
that stands in the way. 't 
Although this opinion is dicta and applies to circumstances other than 
outdoor advertising, it is worthy of note. At least one court has made 
mention of Berman ~· Parker. The Wisconsin Court recently stated: 
"In view of ••• Berman v. Parker, this develoP!nent 
of the law has proceeded to the point that renders it extremely 
doubtful that (the general rule that the zoning power may not 
be exercised for purely aesthetic considerations) is any longer 
the law. u6l 
A legal analysis of outdoor advertising prepared by the Highway Research 
Board cites cases in New York, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and 
Minnesota from 1940 to 1950 which "show the willingness of courts to pred-
icate, if necessary, the validity of police regulations upon aesthetic 
considerations. "62 
Because of the tenuous legal position of aesthetics as a valid factor 
in the exercise of the police power, the courts generally have looked 
to other considerations in the broadened area of general welfare in the 
tradition of St. Louis Gunning Co. ~· St. Louis.63 This case, as discussed 
above, involved displays placed on city streets, where the danger of signs 
being a source of unsanitary conditions or a shield for illicit activity 
is evident. Signs on an open highway do not involve a completely com~ 
parable situationo Application of the principles of the Saint Louis 
case to highways has involved a gradual extension of these principles. 
Aside from aesthetics there are three main defenses of billboard 
control advanced in more recent cases: safety, freedom from intrusion, 
and protection of highway use. 
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Safety. It is perfectly clear that signs that can be directly re-
lated to safety can be regulated under the police power. Such signs would 
be those that obstruct vision at critical points. The Georgia Code 
specifically provides that "no sign may be erected in any place or posi -
~on when it obstructs the view from any public road in the State to any 
other portion of said roads."64 Such cases are, however, the exceptiono 
This is particularly true since the outdoor advertising industry, in its 
own code of ethics, restricts itself in this regard. One code , f or 
example, provides -that "placement of outdoor advertising must permit 
proper sight distance at railway or highway intersections and on the ins i de 
of curves."65 The question arises as to whether or not advertising has 
any relation to safety outside of those obvious cases where v iew is 
obstructed. Is there a relation, for example, between signs appearing on 
a straight stretch of highway and highway safety where the signs do not 
block the view? Defenders of outdoor advertising argue that there is no 
such relation and that, in fact, signs provide stimuli to prevent "high..-
way hypnosis" which results from the routine of unbroken la...ndscapeo 66 
Those on the other side of the question argue that it is a matter of common 
knowledge that it is the very nature of roadsigns to distract and that a 
sign is not effective unless it does this . An automobile traveli ng at 
60 miles an hour covers 88 feet a second. Under these circumstances, 
it is argued, even brief inattention can be fatal and distraction is 
bound to affect safety. In addition, it is pointed outJ the National 
Standards do not entirely forbid billboards. On a typical straight 
stretch, one sign per mile is permitted on each side of the road. A car 
traveling 60 miles an hour will pass a display facing in his direction every 
60 seconds. This should be sufficient to prevent "highway hypnosiso " 
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Discussions on this matter invariably cite safety research work 
done in Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota. 67 The f i ndings of this research 
are conflicting. The Iowa research involved a l aborat ory study under 
simulated highway conditions. The Michigan study present ed a st atistical 
analysis of accidents occurring over a 100-mile stretch of selected high-
way as these accidents might be related to nine fifferent highway features. 
These features included: taverns, gas stations and commercial garages, 
stores, restaurants, other establishments, pr i vate drives, design featur es, 
advertising signs, and vehicle miles. Partial correlat ion coefficients 
were computed to determine the extent to which each of these factors, 
independent of the other factors, is related to accidents. Correlat ion 
between the Iowa and Michigan studies was done by Dr. Lauer of I owa 
State College. The conclusion of these two research projects has been 
summarized as follows: 
"The studies each confirm that there is no significant 
relationship shown between outdoor a~v-ertising signs and high-
way accidents. The evidence, if any, is slightly in favor of 
having something along the highway to arouse the motorist ·) 
and keep him alerted as far as efficient driving is concerned. 
These results fit in very well with what is known about effi-
ciency of performance in many other areas from various psycho-
logical experiments. A certain amount of 'distraction' would 
seem necessary, if it may be so disignated, to keep the driver 
or performer alert and at his highest level of efficiencyo"68 
The Minnesota study involved a statistical analysis of accidents occur-
ring on 510 miles of selected highway. The number of variables in this 
study was more limited than in the Michigan study. Correlations were 
computed for sign frequency, traffic volume, and accident rate. This 
study showed a .positive relationship between sign frequency and accidentsg 
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This difference in expert opinion presents a problem ·for the courtsa 
Since a presumption of constitutionality exists for all properly enacted 
legislative acts, the advantage is in favor of the legislature. It 
would be a mistake, nevertheless, to rely on this completely. While there 
is a presQmption in favor of constitutionalityj the finding of the legis~ 
lature is not determinative.69 In two recent cases involving regulations 
based on the National Standards the courts interpreted the safety factor 
in opposite ways. In Wisconsin the circuit court upheld the regulations~ 
in part, because of the safety factor. In this case the author of the 
Michigan safety study appeared as an expert witness.7° The findings of 
the Minnesota study were cited by the defense. Faced with this conflict 
in testimony, the court commented as follows: 
"We must say that the plaintiffs introduced very formidable 
testirirony> calculated .~- to show that there is no established 
causal relationship between roadside advertising and traffic 
accidents. It was, of course, conceded that advertising signs 
with flashing lights were a hazard. It was also evident that 
there were many other roadside distractions in addition to 
roadside advertising. And it was also evident that some dis-
traction is often conducive toward traffic safety because it 
counteracts the monotony of driving along a smoothj well~ 
engineered turnpike with all the factors present that tend to 
lull a driver to sleep at the wheel. On the other side there 
was testimony calculated to show that any roadsiae s 6~gns · ~~e 
intended· to attract the attention of the driver and that too 
many such signs keep his mind away from his driving and from the 
traffic signs and create a driving hazardo Upon this state of 
the record the legislature was in the position where it had 
basis to find that regulation of roadside advertising was 
in the interests of traffic safety and to ground its legis1ative 
enactment accordingly."71 
In an Ohio case the same safety studies were submitted as evidence and some 
of the same witnesses appeared. The court decided that the testimony of 
experts indicated that there is no relation between safety and outdoor 
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advertising and rejected safety as a basis for implementation of the police 
poW'er. On this point the court stated: 
"Studies have been made and copies of them have been 
introduced into evidence utilizing various investigative procedures 
and mathematical formulas involving the arbitrary use of greater 
or lesser numbers of variables~ from which, through mathematical 
calculations, results may be obtained which can be interpreted as 
applying to this issue. If the process is utilized of using a 
large number of variables which are assumed to affect the occur-
rences of accidents on highways and the mathemati cal procedure 
for the obtaining -of a partial correlation coefficientJ it is 
established that the relationship between advertis ing signs along 
highways and accidents on such highways is negligible. This is 
the gist of the so-called Michigan study, in which study a great 
number of variables arbitrarily assumed to i r:fluence highway 
accidents, including outdoor advertising devices, were utilized. 
The so-called Iowa study comes to the same conclusion. These 
surveys are objective studies, conducted in accordance with what 
the Court believes from the evidence adduced in these cases to 
be recognized and acc~ptable investigating, eval uating and statis-
tical methods. The so-called Minnesota study utilized only 
three variables, namely outdoor advertising devi ces, traffic 
volume, and accidents. Due to the limited number of vari ables 
used in the mathematical analysis employed, in addition to the 
admitted lack of certain components affecting highway accidents 
in the calculation, the weight of the Minnesota study is regarded 
by the Court as negligible, a conc+usion apparently shared by 
counsel for the State as he makes no reference t o nor does he 
rely upon it in his argument in his otherwi se exhaustive briefsG 
No substantial relation between advertising devices as defined 
in the statutes in question and public safety appear s from the 
record of the evidence adduced in the t r ial of these cases. 
If any such relation is shown at all, it is to the effect that 
such devices are beneficial to safety in that they tend to alert 
drivers, to keep them actively attentive to r oadway conditions 
and tend to prevent 'highway hypnosis. '"72 
Freedom From Intrusion. In addition to safety, another factor that 
has been cited as a basis for exercise of the police power is that of free-
dom from intrusion. The position is taken that the right of visibility 
in the case of advertising collides with the right to be let aloneo This 
right has received ample recognition by the courtso For example, regula-
tion of door-to-door solicitation 73 and handbill distribution 74- have been 
Upheld by the courts. The persistent and unavoidable nature of outdoor 
advertising has been noted by the United States Supreme Court i n a decis i on 
upholding a Utah statute making it unlawful to advertise t obacco products 
on outdoor signs. The Court quoted favorably an observation of t he State 
court which said: 
''Advertisements of this sort are constantly before t he eyes 
of observers on the streets and in streetcars to be seen with~ 
out the exercise of choice of volition on their part. Other 
forms of advertising are ordinarily seen as a mat ter of choice 
on the part of the observer. The young people as well as the 
adults have the message of the billboard thrust upon them by all 
the arts and devices that skill_ can produce. In the case of 
newspapers and magazines, there must be some seeking by the one 
who is to see and read the advertisement. The radio can be turned 
off, but not so the billboard."75 
The right of the traveler to be protected from intrusion was cited by 
the court in the Massachusetts billboard case. In this regard t he court 
stated: 
"The right asserted is not to own and use land or propertyJ 
to live, to work, or to trade. While it may comprehend some of 
these essential liberties, its main feature is the super~ 
added claim to use private land as a vantage ground from wh i ch 
to obtrude upon all the public travelling upon highways, whether 
indifferent, reluctant, hostile or interested, &~ une s capable 
propaganda concerning private business with the ultimate de sign 
of promoting patronage of those advertisingo Without this super~ 
added claim, the other rights would have no utility in this 
connection • • • These rules and regulat ions were promulgat ed 
in the exercise of the police power. 0 . (They) must have some 
reasonable basis and be designed to accomplish a permissable 
end, in order to be valid •••. One basisJ according to the finding 
of the master • • • is that the safety of travel upon highways is 
promoted • • • Another basis • • • is that they tend to protect 
ppople traveling upon highways from the intrusion of public 
announcements· thrust before their eyes by s igns and billboardso 
••• The right to own land and to use it according to the owner 's 
conception of profit in the main is a part of the liberty secured 
to the individual under the Constituion; but that right is subject 
to: Je@slati ve regulation in the public interest • 0 • The right 
of thei traveler upon the highways to a peaceful and unannoyed 
journey, so far as concerns advertising on private lands is recognized 
by Art. 50. To adjust the conflicting interests of the public and 
of the individual is a proper legislative function. "76 
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Protection of Highway Use. The argument t ha t outdoor advertising 
involves a violation of the traveler's right to be let alone is not unre~ted 
to the more general objection that outdoor advertising is an unwarranted 
use of the highway in general -- the exploitation of the highway for a use 
not directly intended. According to this view re~Jlation is directed, 
not at property use, but at highway use. The abutting landowner's claim 
is a "permissive easement" which can be withdrawn without compensationo 
There is a suggestion of this line of thought in the classic Massachusetts 
case: 
"The object of outdoor advertising in the nature of things 
is to proclaim to those who travel on highways and t hose who 
resort to public reservations that which is on the advertising 
~evice, and to constrain suchpersons t o see and comprehend 
the advertisement. • •• In this respect the plaintiffs are not 
asserting a natural right 0 • • they are seizing for private 
benefit an opportunity created for a quite different purpose by 
the expenditure of public money in the construction of public 
ways and the acquisition and improvement of public parks and 
reservations."77 
This line of argument would seem to be particularly adapted to the modern 
controlled-access highway where the purpose of the road is different 
from that of highways of the past. The purpose of the Interstate 
Highway is not to serve the local landowners primarily. It is designed 
to handle through-traffic at high rates of speedo The controlled a ccess 
feature of the highway emphasizes this purpose. The relation of the 
abutting landowner to this thoroughfare is quite different from what it 
is to the highway traditionally conceived from antiquity. I n the case of 
a superhighway its proximity to the adjacent land is not indicative of a 
special relation to that land. To claim a right of advertising is to 
exploit it for a use not intended and to obtain advantage from a value 
created by heavy expenditures by the tax payers. Thi s theory is still a 
I I 
. ritY view held in a few states. It "is not consistent with the usual 
m1no 
tnterpretators given the common law of real property, which may be sum-
marized as saying that one's property right includes a right to make any 
Of it that is not absolutely adverse to the public good."78 use 
~~State Thruway Authority vo Ashley Motor Court, Inc.79provides 
an example of the application of this doctrine to the case of a highspped, 
controlled-access highway. In this case the court said: 
" ... it was the very construction of the Thruway which 
created the element of value in the land abutting the road. 
Billboards and other advertising signs are obviously no use 
unless there is a highway to bring the traveler within view 
of them. What was taken by th~ regulation, therefore, was the 
value which the Thruway itself had added to the land and of this 
the defendent cannot be heard to complain." 
In the Allen County, Ohio case there is explicit rejection of this 
view. The Ohio court said in part: 
"The argument advanced by the New York Court in the case of 
New York State Thruway Authority ~0 Ashley Motor Court, Inc., that, 
because advertising devices are obYiously of no use unless there is 
a highway to bring the traveler within view of them, therefore what is 
taken by a state when it prohibits the erection and maintenance of 
billboards along such highway is merely the value which the throughway 
itself has added to the land and therefore the property owner cannot 
complain, is an ingenious one but to this Court, wholly fallacious. 
According to such reasoning no property _owner could complain against 
any of his property rights being taken from him by the one respon-
sible for having brought about a situation whereby his property 
values were increased to the extent of the increase. That is to say, 
if one's property was increased in value because of the erection in 
close proximity to it of either a public or private installation, 
then the owner could not complain if the builder of the installation, 
either public or private, invaded the property rights of the owner 
to the extent of the increase in value thus brought about. Many 
factors are involved in the enhancement of the value of real estate. 
Proximity to other buildings and establishments always is a factor 
in either an increase
1
or decrease in the market value of land. 
Certainly this alone does not entitle the person who has created the 
building or establis~ent to capture for himself or for his own use 
or benefit the portion of the value of the landnwner's property which 
is represented by such increase in value. Nor does such a situation 
entitle the one whose. "construction of such establishment has increased. 
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the value of adjoining or nearby lands to prohibit the owner of 
such lands from enjoying the benefits of the increased values thus 
created. Such argument is novel and to this Court is repugnant 
and certainly should have no place in the determination of issues 
involving the constitutionality of statues."8° 
cases Under the National Standards 
Since the National Standards have gone into effect, three decisions 
have been handed down.81 The Ohio and Wisconsin cases have been referred 
to above, but because of the importance of these opinions to this inquiry 
a brief summary of these cases will be made. 
The Wisconsin case had as plaintiffs, .warren and Wayne Fuller, co-
partners of an establishment comprising a motel, restaurant, and gas 
station along State Highway 41, a part of Highway I94. The plaintiffs 
had on•premise and off-premise signs which had been up for a number of 
years before Highway 41 was made a controlled~access road and designated 
as part of the Interstate System. At about the same time three cases 
were brought before the Court of Common Pleas, Allen County, Ohio, 
testing the constitutionality of that state's law based on the National 
Standards. These cases involved signs maintained by the Ghaster Out-
door Advertising Company on land leased from Ghaster Properties, Inc.: 
a Shell-21-billboard and a Howard Johnson's Motor Lodge and Restaurant 
billboard, all of which were ordered removed by the Director of Highways. 
The three cases were consolidated as Ghaster Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. 
·Preston. In New Hampshire, where advisory opinions of the J ustices of 
the Supreme Court are permitted to be rendered, questions were propounded 
by the House of Representatives to the Supreme Court inquiring whether a 
Proposed law restricting outdoor advertising on the Interstate Highway 
System would violate any constitutional provisions. 
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A review of these cases is enlightening with regard to the issues that are 
raised in such a case and the attitude of the courts in question with respect 
82 
to them. In all three of these cases the issue arose as to whether or not 
the implementation of legislation based on the National Standards involved 
an invalid use of the police power. The Wisconsin court and the New Hampshire 
supreme Court decided that it did not constitute an invalid exercise of such 
~ 
power. Both courts accepted safety as a valid basis. The Wisconsin court 
added that roadside advertising involves "an undersirable intrusion upon the 
sensibilities of persons traveling along and upon the highway." Both 
courts observed that the values of the highway arose from the taxpayers 
and that the interests of the traveling public deserved first consideration. 
The Wisconsin Court held aesthetics to be a proper basiso The New Hampshire 
Court considered aesthetics as at least "entitled to weight" in the delibera~ 
tions of the court without facing the question of whether or not this formed 
a sufficient basis by itself. 
While both of these courts accepted on principle the use of the police 
power in the implementation of legislation based on the National StandardsJ 
both also qualified the opinion. The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court 
of New Hampshire is considerably modified by its comment that its general 
approval is not necessarily automatically applicable to all caseso The Court 
said: 
"If in a specific situation a sign which is in fact not a 
nuisance is forbidden by the bill its removal should be required 
only upon payment of compensation."83 
The Wisconsin court specifically declared certain portions of the Wisconsin 
bill to be discriminatory.84 The statute provided that no sign is permitted 
Within 1,000 feet of another sign and that there should not be in excess of 
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signs within any mile distance measured from any point. The court was dis-
turbed by the method of allocating the limited spaces available. The statute 
stated that "a permit for an eligible sign location shall be issued to the first 
applicant to submit to the Commission's main office at Madison a proper and 
satisfactory application as determined by the Commission." In voicing its ob-
jections to these parts, the court stated: 
"These provisions do not treat fairly and equally all property 
owners and businesses located along and upon the highway. They 
tend to establish and create preferences in the fortunate parties 
who get there first. Such licensing is not fair and reasonable 
regulation. It smacks of monopoly, special . privilege, and favor-
_itism ••• To us these provtsions appear clearly arbitrary and un~ . . __ ,_._ ,, 
reasonably discriminatory:/! 1 
The court concluded that if a more reasonable basis for allocating the permis-
sible spaces could not be found that it would be better to eliminate all signs 
in such spaces. "In our view such elimination would not be a deprivation of 
property rights in viqlation of the constitution since all of the signs here 
referred to exist solely because of the highway and are purely derivativeo"85 
The Ohio court held that the implementation of the Standards did involve 
a "taking" of property in violation of the due process clause. As noted 
above, it rejected safety and aesthetics as a valid basis for exercise of the 
police ' power in this case. It refused also, as we have seen, to recognize 
any limitation on the landowner on the theory that advertising value arises out 
of the highway itself. -The findings of this court are the exact opposite 
of those of the Wisconsin and New Hampshire courts. 
Another point raised in these cases is that the National Standards 
impose restrictions on billboards advertising off~premise activities that they 
do not impose on billboards advertising on-premise activitieso The Ohio court 
decided that this does constitute discrimination. The New Hampshire court held 
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tbat it does not. The Wisconsin court held that the fact that the statute does 
not regulate other roadside structures which are just as much related to safety 
and rnay intrude on sensibilities is not discriminatory. "The classificat i on 
is reasonable and does no violence to constitutional rights. 11 
A contention, in the Wisconsin case, that the regulations abridge freedom 
of the press was rejected by the court. 
An issue that is new to billboard litigation arises under legislation 
based on the National Standards. This is the issue that the agreement which 
the state enters into with the Department of Commerce involves a bargaining 
away of the state's police power. Both the Wisconsin and New Hampshire 
courts rejected this. It seems unlikely, in view of the historical recogni-
tion of the power of governments making up our federal union to enter into bar-
gains and contracts, that any court would invalidate Interstate Highway regula~ 
tions on this basis. Indeed the Interstate Highway itself would not be pos~ 
sible if there were substance to this argument since the act of Congress 
initiating the System provides for a bargain between the state and the federal 
government which includes such things as an agreement to control access. 
In summary, legislation based on the National Standards has had a mixed 
~eception in the courts. In Ohio regulation based on police power was de-
clared unconstitutional. In Wisconsin the regulations were approvedj with the 
exception of certain sections pertaining to the allocation of advertising space. 
In New Hampshire the court generally approved the regulations but left open 
the possibility of litigation for specific cases. The Ohio case has not yet 
been appealed to a higher court. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has sched~ 
Uled the Wisconsin case for hearing arguments during the week of January 7, 196~. 
43 
Georgia Courts and Billboard Regulation 
Research has failed to reveal a single ruling in higher Georgia Court s 
that directly involves billboards and is pertinent to the problem of billboard 
control on the open highway. In Stanfield v. Johnson86 the Court of Appeals 
ruled on the interpretation of Sec. 95-2006 of the Code which refers to t he 
erection of signs that obstruct the view of one portion of a highway to a-
nother. The court stated that the provision applies to signs on private 
property. In Mayor etc. of Savannah~· Bay Realty Company, 87 the Court of 
Appeals was asked to issue a declaratory judgment "on the legality of a penal 
zoning ordinance, or ordinances, of the City of Savannah prohibiting t he 
placing of billboards, or outdoor signs, within 200 feet of Eugene Talmadge 
Memorial Bridge in the City of "Savannah." The circumstances surrounding 
the case are summarized in the headnote ': 
Under the allegations, the extent of the plaintiff's damages 
against Savannah Power & ·Light Company in an impending proceeding 
to exercise its right to an easement to string its elec trical wires 
over the plaintiff's warehouses is dependent upon the legality of a 
penal zoning ordinance, or ordinances, of the City of Savannah 
prohibiting the placing of billboards, or outdoor signs, within 
200 feet of the Eugene Talmadge Memorial Bridge in the City of 
Savannah. The stringing of the electrical wires will prevent the 
plaintiff's proposed use of the roofs of its warehouses for out door 
advertising purposes. It has been agreed between the plaintiff and 
the electric company that the wires may be strung and that the 
electric company will hold its eminent domain proceeding in abeyance 
pending the outcome of the present suit for declaratory judgment as 
to the vali dity of the zoning ordinances. If the ordinance, or 
ordinances, be valid, the plaintiff would have no right to place 
the signs at the proposed points on its roofs, and, consequently, 
~~ the eminent domain proceeding, its damages would be only nomi nalo 
If the ordinance, or ordinances, be valid, the plaintiff would be 
at liberty to place the proposed billboards on its roofs and would 
receive an income of several thousand dollars a year therefrom and, 
consequently, in the eminent domain proceeding, the extent of the 
plaintiff's damages would be considerably more than nominalo 
While the ordinance, or ordinances, are made penal, it appears from 
the petition that the plaintiff does not propose to violate their 
provisions, as it has already permitted the electric company to string 
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its wires over the warehouses, which precludes the erection of the 
outdoor signs or billboards." 
The court refused to rule in this case "since no justiciable controversy 
exists between the plaintiff and the city, within the meaning of the declara-
tory-judgment law." 
88 
In Campbell et al. ~· Hammock et al. there is a general implication 
that at least some billboard ordinances are valid. In this case the petit i oners 
for an injunction to have a billboard removed owned a building fronting 
within a few inches of the sidewalk of a street in Augusta. The defendants 
owned a building on an adjoining lot, the front of which sat back from t he 
sidewalk about 35 feet, leaving a _portion of the petitioners' wall exposed. 
"Petitioners placedan advertising sign on their exposed west wall and a neon 
agn on top of their building; • • thereafter defendants erected a large 
outdoor advertising sign on the east edge of their lot and a few inches from 
petitioners' west wall, completely obscuring the sign on petitioners' wall. " 
The petitioners maintained that the erection of the billboard by the defendants 
was malicious in intent and requested an order for removal. The decision of 
the court is of interest to this study because of the reference to billboard 
ordinances. In its opinion the court stated: 
"The allegations of the petition /as amended were insufficient 
to allege that the billboard constituted a nuisance where, as here , 
it a ears that it was otherwise lawful and was unrestricted by 
statute or by ordinance. Emphasis added. 
Jackson v. Beavers89 involved the constitutionality of an act of the 
legislature prohibiting professional bondsmen from soliciting business. In 
a general discussion of the police power, the following statement appears: 
"Under the police power the height of buildings in a city 
may be regulated. Welch v. Swasey 214 U. S. 91 (Sup. 567, 53 L. ed. 
923) Billboards in cities-rna be re lated. St. Louis Adv. Go. v. 
St. Louis, 2 9 U. s. 2 9 39 Sup. Ct. 27 , 63:L. ed. 59~(Emphasis 
fUrd§&i.8 ) 
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Since the circumstances of these cases involved billboards within a 
citY and the references to regulation are indirect ones, they are of limited 
help, at most, in the problem we are considering. There being no definitive 
case in Georgia on the subject of billboards on highways, we must look to 
the attitude of the courts concerning application of the police power in com-
parable situations for a guide • . Decisions of the court in the related field ~ 
of zoning are the most revealing. Comments of the court on the use of the 
police power in the .;regulation of businesses, professions, and occupations 
are also helpful. 
The Police Power, General Principles. The general principles of the 
police power discussed before in this report are followed in the Georgia 
courts. "This power [the police power] is very broad. It has limits and 
boundaries, but they are far-flupg."9° Acts of the legislature will not be 
declared invalid unless it is clear that they are so. In ·DeBerry Vo LaGrange91 
it is stated: 
tl •• it should be borne in mind that there is a presumption 
in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactmento" 
If an act is susceptible of two constructions, "in such cases the construction 
which will uphold the constitutionality of the law is rather to be preferred. "92 
It has also been said: 
"A large discretion is necessarily invested in the legis-
lature to determine (a) what the interests of the public require, 
and (b) what measures are necessary for the protection of such 
interests."93 
Nevertheless the court has declared that "exercise of the police power 
by the General Assembly is subordinate to the Constitution of the State;"94 
and that "legislative authority may not unreasonably invade private rights, 
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as to violate such rights as are granted by the Constitution."95 The 
so l J 
twin obligation of the courts to recognize legitimate exercise of the police 
j 
power and, at the same time, to prevent violations of the due=process and 
equal-protect~on clauses is succinctly summarized in B~amby ~· State:96 
"As in all cases where the constitutionality of a statute is 
involved, we are confronted, on the one hand, with the duty of sus-
taining the act unless its validity is clear and palpable, ~nd on 
the other with the positive command of the constitution of this 
State that legislative acts in violation of either the State or the 
Federal constitution are void, and the judiciary shall so declare 
them ••• The resporlsibilities thus imposedJ while entirely consistent, 
require a survey in opposite directions, and the greatest care must 
be tak,en that neither of them is violated. The constitution of 
this ~tate empowers the General Assembly to make all laws and ordi-
nances consistent with this constitution, and not repugnant to the 
constitution of the Unitetl States, which they shall deem necessary 
and proper for the welfare of the State'' ••• The plain meaning 
of this provision is that the General Assembly can not exercise an 
anbounded authority in determining what is necessary and proper for 
the public welfare, but must proceed, in this as ; in -other instances, 
consistently with const~tut~onal guaranties •• )The regulation of 
a lawful busines~ ••• is dependent upon some reasonable necessity 
for the protection of the public health, safety, morality, or other 
phase of the general welfare; and unless an act restricting the ordinary 
occupations of
1
life can be said to bear some reasonable relation to one 
or more of thes~ general objects of the police power, it is repugnant 
to constitution~l guaranties and void." 
I 
The Pmlice Power and Zoning Ordinances. To understand precisely what 
the courtr will recognize as "reasonable" necessity for the protection of 
the general welfare, we must look to the decisions of the courts on speci-
fie issues. The history of zoning ordinances provides one example. Prior 
to 1928 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the zoning cases brought before it 
represented an invalid exercise of the police powero Smith ~· City97 of 
Atlanta, in 1925, involved, "primarily, the decision of the constitution-
' I 
ality of certain ordinances of the City of Atlanta, known as the zoning 
ordinances· and as incidental thereto, the constitutionality of certain 
J , ' 
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provisions of an act of the legislature approved August 4, 1921, being an act 
to amend the charter of the City of Atlanta, under authority of which the 
ordinances in dispute were enacted." The Court continued: 
"So far as it relates to the case made in this record., the ordi-
nance in effect prohibited the erection of buildings to be used as 
retail stores upon any property in a district of the city set apart, 
under the ordinance . referred to, as a residence section. If that 
part of the act vhich authorized the city to so redistrict or divi de 
up the city into zones is constitutional and valid, then it would 
seem to follow that the ordinance is also valid; and if that part of 
the act of the General Assembly to which we make special reference 
is unconstitutional and invalid, then that part of the ordinance 
passed in conformity to the act is also invalid. And so the principal 
and controlling question that we have to deal with is t he constitu ... 
tional.ity and validity of the act and ordinance in question; or, 
rather, the constitutionality of that part of the act and ordinance 
which prevents the building of stores upon property located in the 
districts made residential by the city's ordinance. 
"The right to redistrict the city and to prohibit the erecti on 
of business houses and stores in certain districts is claimed by 
the city, not under its right of eminent domain, for no compensati on 
is to be pai n_ to those property owners who are refused the r i ght to 
erect stores} but it is asserted as a proper exercise of the police 
power II 
"The act of the legislature containing the authority for 
the ordinance in question recites that the power of zoning is con-
ferred 'in the interest of the public health~ safety, order, con-
venience, comfort, prosperity, ' etc. But legislative dec l arations 
of facts that are material only as the ground for enacting a law 
will not be held conclusive by the courts • • • While the legisla-
ture is the sole judge as to matters pertaining to the policy, wis-
dom, and expediency of statutes enacted under the police law, the 
question as to whether the particular legislation purporting to be 
enacted in the exercise of the police power is really such, and 
whether r~gulations prescribed by the legislature are constitu-
tional, are questions for the judiciary. " 
In this ~learly defined case of exercise of the police power, the court rul ed 
that the enabling act of the General Assembly, and the ordinance passed by 
the City of Atlanta in pursuance of that act, were unconstitutional and in-
valid. 
A similar ruling was handed down in Morrow v. City of Atlanta98 i n 1926: 
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"Under the ruling of this court in Smith v. Atlanta ••• the 
municipal authorities of the City of Atlanta are not authorized to 
interfere with the use of plaintiff's garage in the rear of his resi-
dence for carrying on the lawful business of storing and repairing 
automobile tires •••• In so far as the zoning ordinance of the City 
of Atlanta • • • seeks to deprive the owner of real estate there~ 
after designated as an apartment zone of the right to use his realty 
in the pursuit of a business recognized as lawful, such ordinance 
is unconstitutional and void." 
In 1927 a constitutional amendment was passed authorizing the General 
Assembly to grant to cities authority to pass zoning and planning laws.99 
It was ratified by the people in the following year. The provision was subse~ 
quently amended several times. 100 In 1937 authority to grant to counties the 
same power was incorporated into the eonstitution. These provisions were 
included in the revision of the constitution in 1945 as Sec. 2~1923. Follow-
ing the amendment in 1928, the general principle of zoning by municipalities 
was approved by the court. Howden v. SavannahlOl dealt with a denial of a 
building permit to erect a gasoline filling-station in an area restricted 
under a Savannah ordinance. The court reasoned as follows: 
"The precise question for · adjudication is this: Is the denial 
to the owner of a residence lot located in a district zoned, by a 
I . 
city ordinance passed in pursuance of ·legislative and constitu~ 
tional authority, exclusively for residences, apartments~ churches, 
hospitals, schools, and hotels, of a permit to erect on such lot a 
gasoline filling-station ~ deprivation of her property within the 
meaning of the due-process clauses of the constitution of this 
State and of the l~th. amendmemt to the constitution of the United 
States? In other words, can an owner of land be constitutionally 
denied the right to eFect thereon a building for the conduct of a 
business therein, if neither the business nor the manner of its 
operation constitutes a nuisance? ••• (We) have now in the con~ 
stitution as now amended both the due-process clause and this zoning 
provision. They must be construed together. In view of this 
amendment it can no longer be held that a zoning statute, which 
authorizes a city embraced within it, to pass a zoning and plan-
ning ordinance, is per se unconstitutional and void because it de-
prives the owner of real estate of his property without due process 
of law. This constitutional provision supersedes the decisions of 
this court which declared zoning statutes unconstitutional and void 
because they denied due process of law to the owners of real estate 
embraced in zoning districts." 
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Howden ~· Savannah has bee:o followed by the court in subsequent zoning 
cases down to the present time. 102 It is perfectly clear that the basic valid-
itY of zoning laws rests, in the mind of the courts, on the constitutional 
amendment. Schofield ~· Bishop103 which follows the principle annunciated in 
Howden ~· Savannah refers, in connection with zoning authority, to "the power 
of a governing body, whether under the police power, as is permitted in some 
states or under a specific constitutional provision as in this State. " (Em-
phasis Added.) 
One of the most recent cases on the question of zoning is Vulcan Mat erials 
Co. ~· Griffith, decided in 1960. This case involved an equitable action to 
enjoin the operation of a quarry. One of the counts of the petition alleged 
that operation of a quarry was being permitted in a district zoned agricul-
tural in violation of the zoning regulations of Fulton County. The special use 
permit issued by the zoning commissioners exempting a tract of land from the 
regulations applying generally to a zoned district presented the court with 
the problem usually referred to as "spot zoning." Bitdsey ~· Wesleyan Collegl04 
says: 11Spot zoning generally relates to action in *lifting out' of a zoned 
area one unit, or one particular piece of property." Spot zoning was ruled out 
by the Court in Snow ~· Johnston (1943),1°5 Birdsey ~· Wesleyan College106 
(1955), and Neal~· City of Atlanta (1956). 107 On the other hand spot zoning 
was approved in an earlier decision, McC'ord_ ~· Ed Bond and Condon Co. (l932)ol08 
In Vulcan Materials Co. ~· Griffith the court notes the conflict in these opin-
ions. The decision written by Chief Justice Duckworth, provides summary of 
the history of the development of zoning law in Georgia and the current broad 
attitude of the court. It deserves to be quoted at length: 
" ••• lawyers and judges of this State before the dawn of 
constitutional consent to zoning of private property had become 
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saturated with the fact that the Constitution respected and held 
inviolate private property and insured equal protection of the owner 
in the use of such property. But the people by their votes amended 
or changed this constitutional guardianship of private property, 
and in the process stipped their judiciary of power to protect it, 
as had theretofore been the case. By the constitutional change the 
people voluntarily subjected their property to the Qnlimited control 
and regulation of legislative departments. The Constitution (Code~ 
Sec. 2-1923) now provides: 'The General Assembly of the State 
shall have authority to grant the governing authorities of the 
municipalities and counties authority to pass zoning and planning 
laws whereby such cities or counties may be zoned or district.ed 
for various uses and other or different uses prohibited therein~ 
and regulating the use for which said zones or districts may be 
set apart, and regulating the plans for develcpment and improve-
ment on real estate therein.' Pursuant to this constitutional 
authority, Georgia Laws 1939, p. 584 (applicable to Fulton County), 
and Georgia Laws 1952, p. 2689 (applicable to counties having a 
population of 300,000 or more) were enacted. These acts conferred 
upon county governing authorities all the powers the Constitution 
authorized. Section 24 of the 1939 act and section 25 of the 1952 
act, in identical terms, provide that the county governing author-
ities are 'clothed with all of the authority which the General 
Assembly can grant to such authorities • • • under the laws of the 
State of Georgia. ' In defining zones and districts and the uses 
therein, the General Assembly conferred equally unlimited power to 
those mentioned in the Constitution. They vested in the county 
authorities the power to zone property without limitation as to the 
number of such zones, and without limitation as to the uses allowed 
or prohibited; and without specification as to the procedure, other 
than a resolution_, notice, and a hearing, to be followed in zoning 
or the time when such zoning should become effective • • • Such 
limitless powers are simply beyond judicial review • o•• I t would 
seem that the foregoing quotations from the Constitution and 
statutes demonstrate plainly that the county co~missioners have 
complete freedom to create any number of zones and districts and 
of such size and shape as they may arbitrarily choose. Thi s means 
that they have the authority to create zones or districts of any 
size, whether 10 feet square or any number of acres in any con-
ceivable shape. The utter impossibility of bringing the terms 
and conditions of such legisl~tive powers to judicial decisions 
perhaps explains why the county authorit ies are required to give per~ 
sons to be affected by proposed zonings an opportunity to be heard. 
The kind of hearing is not prescribed, and irrespective of what is 
shown at such hearings, the authorities are given absolute power to 
proceed as they choose in total disregard of what such hearings re-
veal. 
"When the act plainly empowers the county authorities to amend 
or to modify existing zones, and proscribes no particular instru-
mentality by which such amendments or modifications must be effect-
uated, the courts are given no power to prescribe the instrumentalities 
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or to condemn any procedures by which the authorized result is accom-
plished. This means that it is idle for a court to attempt to dis-
tinquish between such terms as spot zoning and special use permits. 
(Emphasis in original) 
••• Indeed both the Constitution and statutes authorize what 
this court has called spot zoning. The courts must refuse to in-
terfere with the legislative acts of zoning because the courts are 
given neither chart nor compass by which to adjudicate and condemn 
the actions of zoning authorities. We therefore conclude that the 
people must submit to the legislative control of their property, 
or change the Constitution to afford the courts something to stand 
upon in protecting private propoerty. We have neither the infor-
mation, experience nor desire to make public policy in respect to 
legislative control of the uses of private propertyo " 
Police Power in Cases Other Than .Zoning. Examples of the courts' atti-
tude on the use of the police power, other than zoning, are available. In 
Brinkman ~· City of Gainesvillel09 an ordinance prohibiting the operation 
of a loud speaker or public address system upon the streets of the city was up~ 
held as constitutional. In part the court said: 
"The thoroughfares of cities are for the comfort and con-
venience of all people using them. They are maintained by the 
public, and to say that anyone has a constitutional right to use~ 
on these streets, a loud speaker or public-address system from 
any vehicle, it seems to us overlaps and interferes with the consti-
tutional rights of other people." 
It has also been held that the transportation of passengers for hire 
in a taxicab on the city streets i .s not an inherent right and can be regu-
lated.110 The regulation of professional bondsmen is not unconstitutionalelll 
In Cutsinger :::_. City of Atlanta,l12 the general principles of when it is 
permissible to require a license of a business or occupation are laid downo 
"The police power to grant licenses by which one person can 
conduct a certain business and another can not, or by which a 
business may be conducted at a certain place and not at another, 
necessarily involves some discrimination for the public welfare. 
~uch licenses have been broadly grouped into four classes: (1) 
Where promiscuous or indiscriminate freedom to act will disturb 
public order or interfere with the common use of public placeso 
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A type of this class is in regard to permitting the use of the public 
streets for parades or processions • e • (2) Where an occupat i on is 
offensive to comfort or endangers public safety, it may be so 
restricted as to locality or the manner in which it shall be con-
ducted as not to cause injury. Chemical factories and slaughter~ 
houses furnish examples of this class. (3) In some occupat ions 
the lack of personal qualifications or competence ca~ses the danger 
to the public, and requires to be guarded against. Doctors , 
dentists, and plumbers are illustrations of this class. (4) 
Some occupations are held to be such as to involve danger to the 
public peace, order, or morality, and therefore to be proper sub-
jects for regulation or licensing so as t o prevent injury to t he 
public ••• Pawnbrokers and junkdealers ill ustrate this class. " 
On the basis of these guidelines licenses can be required for hotels and room-
ing houses. 113 Curb markets can be regulatedoll4 However, a munic i palit y 
cannot refuse a permit to operate such a business at arbitrary discretion or 
after the conditions for obtaining a permit have been fulfilled, unless the 
business is a nuisance per se. An act of the General Assembly passed in 1937 
establishing a State board of photographic examiners and requiring persons de-
siring to engage in the business of ·photography or photofinishing t o stand an 
examination and qualify as to competency, ability, and integrit y was declared 
to be unconstitutional as an exercise of the police power not bearing "any 
reasonable or substantial relation to the public health, safety, or morality, 
or other phase of the general welfare."ll5 
A nuisance is defined in the Georgia Code as "anything that works hurt , 
- d.:. • ~ ;. t 
inconvenience, or damage to another; and the fact that the act done may other~ 
wise be lawful shall not keep it from being a nuisanceo The inconvenience 
complained of shall not be fanciful, or such as would affect onl y one of fastid~ 
ious taste, but it shall be such as would affect an ordinary reasonable man. "116 
The courts have ruled that steam laundries and dr y cleaning establishments are 
not nuisances per~ but may be such .by reason of the way in which they are 
operated 117 . Airports are not nuisances per ~· Gasoline f i lling-stations 
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are not nuisances because they are erected in residential sections. 118 Ceme-
teries are not nuisances when placed in proximity to a residential areaGll9 
In DeBerry ~· City of LaGrange120 the Appeal Court dealt with an ordi-
nance prohibiting peddlers' going from door-to-door soliciting orders, and 
declared this to be a nuisance. The court held the ordinance, with it's com-
plete prohibition of door-to-door soliciting, to be unreasonable regulationo 
The court stated: 
"We do not mean to say that the individual is not entitled 
to the right of privacy, and that where he so desires he can not 
himself prevent a visitation by such solicitors; for to persist 
after notice would be a trespass. Nor do we mean to hold that in 
such cases a municipality could not, by ordinance, aid in the 
prevention of such a trespass. But we do think that the unlimited 
imposition of a penalty on an uninvited solicitor who is carrying 
on a lawful and legitimate business in the usual way, manner, 
and time is an unreasonable and arbitrary infringement of his rights." 
On this same issue the Georgia Supreme Court has been divided.l2l 
Grubbs v. Wootenl22 contains a statement that is worth noting. In this 
case owners of adjacent property petitioned to have a business involving the 
display and sale of tombstones in a residential area declared to be a nui-
sance and therefore prohibited. In the brief of the attorney for the plain-
tiffs it was stated: "We do .not claim that the cemetary-like display is neces-
sarily a nuisance per ~ but we do claim that it can be a nuisance ver acci~epB_ .. " 
It was argued that in an exclusively residential neighborhood the constant view 
of the "graveyard-like" appearances of the display would prey upon the minds 
of individuals and injure health. The business involved was unrestricted 
by statute or ordinance. The court refused to declare the business to be a 
nuisance. In a lengthly discussion of a case cited by the plaintiff, however, 
matters relevant to outdobr advertising regulation are indirectly touched upo~ o 
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The case cited is State ex rel. Civello ~· New Orleans. 123 The Louisiana 
supreme Court held that the legislature could authorize municipalities, by 
exercise of the police power of the state, to adopt an ordinance establish-
ing zoning districts. The decision of the Louisiana court is quoted at length: 
nThe Supreme Court of the United States maintains, and the State 
courts that have dealt with this subject also maintain, that aesthe-
tic considerations alone do not justify an exercise of the police 
power to limit a .person's right to use his property as he sees fit. 
It is said, though, that if the primary consideration for the 
enactment of an ordinance limiting the individual's right to use 
his own property is a substantial consideration of public health, 
safety, comfort, or general welfare, considerations of taste and 
beauty may also enter in, and be not out of place • • • If by the 
term 'aesthetic considerations' is meant a regard merely for outward 
appearances, for good taste in the matter of the beauty of the neigh~ 
borhood itself, we do not observe any substantial reason for saying 
that such a consideration is not a matter of general welfare. The 
beauty of a fashionable residence neighborhood in a city is for the 
comfort and happiness of the residents, and it sustains in a general 
way the value of property in the neighborhhod. It is therefore 
as much a matter of general welfare as is any other condition that 
fosters comfort or happiness and consequent values generally of the 
property in the neighborhood. Why should not the police power avail, 
as well to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the 
sense of sight, as to suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by 
offending the sense of hearing, or the olfactory nerves? An eyesore 
in a neighborhood of residences might be as much a public nuisance, 
and as ruinous to property values in the neighborhood generally, 
as a disagreeable noice, or odor, or a menace to safety or health. 
The difference is not in principle, but only in degree. In fact, 
we believe that the billboard case, Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U.So 526, 
37 Sup. Ct. 190, 61 l. ed. 472, L.R.A. l918A, 136 Ann cas. l917C, 
594, or St • . Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 149 U.S. 
249, 39 Sup.~274 63 L. ed~ 599 • --•• might have rested as logically 
upon the so-called aesthetic considerations as upon the supposed other 
considerations of general welfare." 
The Georgia Supreme Court makes the following comment on this quotation: 
"~i;l.e foregoing decision did not involve the exact question of 
enjoining asa nuisance a display for sale of tombstones and monu~ 
ments, such ·as is involved in the instant case. If it had in-
volved such question and the court had ruled that a nuisance was 
created that should have been enjoined by the courts, the decision 
would not have been harmonious with the provisions of the Code, 
and the decisions of this court herein above cited." 
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This statement of the court relates to a hypothetical situation and 
involves a comparion of court decisions with a different set of facts. 
The exact and precise meaning of the statement isJ therefore, unclear. 
The general impression given, however, is that the court does not approve 
the reasoning of the Louisiana Court on what justifies an exercise of the 
police power in the case of zonibg; specifically, it does not accept aesthe-
tics as a legitimate justification. 
conclusion 
There are two possible approaches for regulation of outdoor adver-
tising along the Interstate System in Georgia, without the purchase of 
easements: 
(1) Direct exercise of the police power on the basis of protection 
of the general welfare; 
(2) A constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to regu-
late advertising. 
Police Power. How the courts would treat legislation based on the 
first of these alternatives is clearly unknown. As we have seen, the 
courts refused to recognize as legitimate the exercise of the police 
power in regard to zoning by municipalities. These cases involve, how-
ever, the acts of municipaJ~i'ties, even though based on legislative author-
ization. It is possible that the courts might be more liberal in re-
viewing acts of the General Assembly. 124 In DeBerry ~· LaGrange the court 
makes a distinction between the limitations of the power of the two 
authorities. This case involved, as we have seen, an ordinance for~ 
lidding door-to-door soliciting. In its opinion the court said: 
"This court is asked to declare the above ordinance uncon ... 
stitutional, or unreasonable or arbitrary. In order to justify 
a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional or 
a provision of a State constitution to be in contravention of the 
constitution of the United States, the case must be so clear 
as to be free from all doubt • • • This same ruLe of construction 
ordinarily is applied by this court in passing on the validity 
of ordinances of a municipality the charter of which gives 
to it the right to make or pass such ordinances. However, 'Muni-
cipal ordinances must be reasonable • . The limitations of the 
power of a city council in this regard are not t a be measureu 
by the more extensive powers of the State legislature.' Mayor 
Etc. of Savannah v. Cooper, 131 Ga. 670, 676, 63 S. E. 13~. 
In approaching such a que·stion, or in determining such a question, 
it should be borne in mind that there is a presumption in favor 
of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment ••• An ord-
inance, however, may be declared invalid because unreasonable with-
out declaring it unconstitutional." 
If the court were to accept the exercise of the police power in bill-
board control as valid, it is highly unlikely that it would do so on the 
basis of aesthetics. Whether the court would accept the argument used in 
other outdoor advertising cases relating to the protection of' the traveler 
from unreasonable intrusion of billboards upon his privacy, is unknown. 
In Brinkman ~· City of Gainesville, discussed above, the court upheld 
the prohibition of the use of a loud speaker on the city streets on 
the basis that "it interferes with the constit1.:1tional rights of other 
people." While the court refused to uphold outright prohibition of door-
to-door soliciting in DeBerry ~· City of LaGrange, it did say that a muni~ 
cipali ty could aid, by ordinance, in the prevention of t.re~pass. To draw 
a specific conclusion from .these cases, by inference, about the court's 
attitude toward outdoor advertising would be unwarranted. As discussed 
above, some jurisdictions have recognized the argument that any increase 
in the value of abutting land through potential advertising revenues comes 
from the Interstate Highway and therefore the landowner has no reason for 
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complaint if this increase in value is taken away by regulation. The em-
phasis given by Georgia courts, in its long history~ to the constitu-
tional provisions protecting private property makes it unlikely that the 
court would accept this reasoning. 
In setting a foundation for billboard control in Georgia, it would 
probably be better to argue along the lines of safety and the protection 
of economic values in the State. The Florida courts have emphasized 
the protection of scenic beauty as a stimulus to tourist trade. A study 
prepared by the Bureau of ·Business Research, the University of Georgia, 
indicates the economic importance of tourism in Georgia. This report 
shows that in the twelve month period, September, 196~August, 1961, out-
of-State residents made 6,510,171 recreation trips in privately owned 
vehicles that ended in Georgia as a destination or involved passage through 
the State. Georgia residents made 7,670,026 such trips.l25 During the 
same period total expenditures by tourists and recreation travelers, via 
automobile, were estimated as a little over $273 million. 126 The data pro-
vided in this study gives strong support to the argument that there are 
solid economic reasons for protecting the natural beauty of Georgia high-
ways. 
Constitutional Amendment. .In view of the history of zoning regulation, 
it is rather certain that a regulatory statute backed by a constitutional 
amendment would be upheld by the court. This would undoubtedly be the best 
way to proceed in implementing billboard regulation. There is a problem 
of timing, however. The earliest that a constitutional amendment could- be 
ratified in a general election is 1964. The deadline for entering into a 
contract with the Secretary of Commerce is in 1963. One solution to this 
dilemma is to pass a constitutional amendment and a billboard statute at 
the next session of the legislature. It is possible that litigation might 
not reaqh the court until aft·er the people had had a chance to ratify 
the amendment in 1964. If this, in fact, happened, the question would 
arise as to ~hether or not the 1964 amendment can apply to a s t atute 
passed in 1963. Even if the court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because the amendment was not retroactive, the legislature could 
simply pass the statute again, bringing it under the constitutional 
a.mendmen t • 
Because of this problem of timing the question arises as to whether 
or not Section 2-1923 of the constitution, which gives the General Assembly 
the power to grant to municipalities and counties authority to pass zoning 
and planning laws, does not also imply that the General Assembly itself 
has the authority to zone and, accordingly, the authority to regulate 
billboards. In answer to this, it should be emphasized~ first of all, 
that the constitutional provision refers to zoning. It is questionable 
whether billboard regulation by the State along the lines of the National 
Standards is, strictly speaking, zoning. The regulation of buildings 
and structures in urban areas is quite old historically. Billboard regu-
lation dates back to the 19th. century. Zoning, on the other hand, is a 
relatively new concept in the United States, "the first comprehensive 
zoning law having been enacted in 1916 in New York City."l27 "Zoning11 has 
been defined as: 
"a technical term broadly signifying a scheme of regula-
tion of land uses, in exercise of the police power, which entails 
the division of corporate area of a municipality into zones 
or districts and the prescribing of the types of land uses that 
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are permitted in each zone or district to subserve the public 
health, safety, morals of J>Ublic welfare of the community."l28 
Note that this specifies the setting off of districts within which regula-
tions of land uses created for the district apply uniformly. If the land 
adjacent to the Interstate System were divided into classified segments 
within some of which regulations applied uniformly while other segments 
were unregulated or controlled by a different set of provisions, this.~ 
would approximate what is generally understood by " . " zon1ng. The provisions 
of the National Standards call, however, for something different. They 
provide for spacing and limitations as to number and size along the entire 
length. 
As a matter of fact, however, The Georgia Supreme Court has explicitly 
stated that Section 2~1923 does not empower the General Assembly to pass 
zoning regulations. In Herrod et. al. ~· O'Beirene,l2~ the Court stated: 
"Prior to this time (the Constitutional Amendment of 1928) 
this court- had consistently held that counties and municipal-
ities were without authority to zone property even if the charter 
of the municipality gave them the right to zone • • • It 
follows that any right to zone property in this State -must be 
found in the amendment to the Constitution above quoted. 
"A mere reading of this provison will disclose that the 
only authority therein granted to the legislature is the authority 
to delegate to counties and municipalities the right to zone. 
Neither under this provision of our Constitution, nor under 
any other provision of our Constitution or laws, has the legis-
lature the right to zone property. This constitutional amend~ 
ment vests this power in the local authorities where it properly 
belongs." 
Further Legal Problems. Aside from the general problem of the overall 
legality of billboard control, the soundness of specific provisions 
has to be considered. For example, legislation should allow for noncon-
forming use. If a sign were a nuisance per se -- if it were directly and 
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obviously detrimental to safety -- an order for its immediate removal 
would be permissable. In other situations a reasonable period of time 
should be allowed for amortization of the investment. A five-year period 
of grace was held reasonable by a Maryland court in 1957.13° On the other 
hand a two year period was held to be unreasonably short in an Iowa case 
in 1956.131 Although most state statutes implementing the National Stan-
dards do not allow for a period of nonconforming use, this is not true 
of all. Kentucky allows signs erected before the enactment of the outdoor 
advertising prohibition to be maintained for five years. 
If bil lboard regulation by the State were upheld in Georgia, a require-
ment that a permit be obtained for each sign would probably also be upheld. 
It would be better, though, not to pass a requirement, as some states have, 
that outdoor advertising companies be licensed by the State. In view 
of the narrowly defined conditions for requiring a license of a business 
laid down in Cutsinger~· City of Atlanta, 132 discussed above, it is safer 
if such provisions are not included in Georgia law. 
The limitation in the National Standards on the number of billboards 
allowed per mile means that the State may receive more applications for 
permits on a given stretch of highway than there are spaces available. 
This creates the thorniest problem with which administrators of billboard 
regulation must deal. The lower court in the Wisconsin case, discussed 
above, was disturbed by the fact that no equitable system had been devised 
for the allocation of limited spaces. Although nothing in the record has 
been found to substantiate this, it seems likely that the provision in 
the National Standards for "information sites" was included in an effort 
to solve this problem. With such sites available an indefinite number of 
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posters could be handled. This does not seem to the writers of this report, 
however:; t o be a feasible solution. The information sites are not prac-
tical. They require the motorist to leave a high speed throughway for the 
express purpose of viewing billboards. It is unlikely that the typical 
motorist will do this. A merchant who has been assigned a space on the 
highway itself has an advantage over another whose poster is assigned 
space at an information site. We know of no solution to this administra-
tive probl em •. But if the courts will not recognize a "first-come, first-
serve" system as a legitimate attempt to solve a difficult problem, 
then limitation of the number of billboards on highways is impossible. 
A problem vaguely similar to this exists in zoning. If, in districts 
zoned commercial~ the minimum size lot is regulated by ordinance, then a 
limited number of spaces for businesses are available. In Schofield v. 
Bishop:;l33 where a zoning ordinance forbidding retail stores in a residen-
tial district was considered, it was stated in the headnote that "in the 
restictions as to the use of property contained in the ordinance under 
review there is no such discrimination as to create a monoply in those 
) 
persons in the municipality whose property is not so affected." On the 
other hand it was stated in Jones ::c_. City of Atlanta134 that "a munici-
pality 0 • 0 has no authority, by ordinance, to declare a useful and per 
~ pefectly lawful business a nuisance, and provide for the issuance of 
permits by the city, which may be granted or declined in the discretion 
of the governing authorities." The case involved an ordinance which said, 
in part: 
11Where as, the presence of curb markets has grown to be 
a nuisance in many sections of the city where they are now lo-
cated, and Council should pass upon these locations frequently 
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in order to protect the communities from such nuisances; 
therefore be it ordained by the Mayor and General Council 
as follows: That operators, owners, and managers of curb 
markets shall obtain a permit from the Council every six 
months • " 
defendent in the case made application for a permit and it was refused. 
was shown that a permit was issued to others in the immediate vicinity 
conduct a similar business." The court ruled that: 
"The ordinance in the present case is discriminatory, 
for it allows the arbitrary granting of the permit to some and 
the refusal to others • • • The granting of a hearing before 
a commission who have arbitrary power to grant or refuse a 
permit is of itself a denial of the due process clause of 
the Constitution _ of the State." 
the Georgia Courts would rule on the granting of permits to some and 
to others because of the limitation on spaces available is not known. 
III. A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING CONTROL 
lEtroduction 
This section of the report is concerned with the financial factors 
involved in the adoption of the National Standards regarding outdoor 
advertising along the Interstate System. Essentially it is a flow of 
funds analysis which divides itself logically into two parts: first, 
the inflow of funds · derived from the adoption of the National Standards; 
and second j the outflow of funds necessitated by such a move. Specifically 
consideration will be given to the probable amount of the federal bonus 
payment (the additional one half of one per cent of the total cost of con-
struction of controlled portions of the system) and to the administra-
tive expenses involved in enforcing the standards. At the outset it must 
be stated that no definitive figures for either of these amounts is con-
tained herein; such accuracy is impossible without better data. Neverthe-
less it is believed that the amounts involved are subject to measurement 
within certain limitsj and a decision regarding the move under considera-
tion need not be made in total ignorance of its economic irnplicationso 
The Federal Bonus Payable 
As noted in the previous discussion of the Federal-Aid Highway 
Act of 1958, those states entering into agreements with the Secretary 
of Commerce to control outdoor advertising along the Interstate System 
consistent with the National Standards are entitled to an additional one 
half of one per cent of the cost of constructing such portions of highway. 
Certain sections are ineligible for participation, however, in this bonus. 
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In a report entitled Study of Proposed Control of Advertising Along 
the Interstate Highways in Georgia, prepared by the Division of Highway -
Planning of the State Highway Department of Georgia and dated October 10, 
1961, an attempt was made to determine the mileage of Interstate in 
Georgia which would apply thereto. Briefly, the findings of that study 
indicated that of a total of 1,108 miles of Interstate Highway within the 
state, approximately 535 miles, costing an estimated $317,676,000, would 
be eligible for participation in the increased federal share. On this 
basis the bonus would amount to approximately $1,588,000. 
A study. of the method used in that study for determining the total 
eligible mileage figure leads to a question as to its accuracy, however. 
The report indicated that approximately 43 miles of Interstate highway 
within the state were to be constructed upon right-of-way acquired prior 
to July 1, 1956. There is no doubt but that this mileage should be sub-
tracted from the total in order to arrive at the appropriate figure for 
the purpose of calculating the federal bonus. But an additional 530 
miles, or very nearly one-half of the total mileage of the Interstate 
System, was also treated as ineligible. It is in connection with these 
530 miles of highway that a question arises. 
The basis for eliminating these 530 miles of highway from consider-
ation as eligible for the bonus payment appears to have been that they lie 
within the boundaries of counties in which a planning commission exists 
and is operative. A close reading of the provisions of the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1958 which relate to the exemption of areas zoned in-
dustrial or commercial, however, does not seem to support such a blanket 
ex·clusion. According to the Act, only those segments of highway travers-
ing areas zoned commercial or industrial which lie within the boundaries 
of incorporated municipalities (not counties) are ineligible for consider-
ation in determining the amount of the federal bonus payment. As a matter 
of fact, the term "county" does not appear in this section of the Act. 
Thus it is our belief that the original estimate of the total 
mileage eligible for the federal bonus is overly conservative, although 
we are not in a position to correct the estimate precisely. If our inter-
pretation of the provisions of the Act is correct, however, it would appear 
that a new estimate should be drawn up by the Department, in which only 
those portions of highway traversing areas zoned industrial or commercial 
which lie within the boundaries of incorporated municipalities are to be 
excluded, and a revised estimate of the bonus be calculated on this basis. 
Whatever the result of such a calculation, the original estimate of approx-
imately $1. 5 million would certainly seem to be a safe lower limit. .An 
estimate of the upper limit would at this point represent conjecture on 
our part .;since data on what proportion of the 530 miles, to be added in, 
is zoned industrial or commercial are not available. 
Whatever the amount of the federal bonus which the State might 
receive, it will represent an amount to be paid as the highway is con-
structed. On the other hand, any costs associated with enforcing the 
National Standards must be paid indefinitely into the future. This dis-
tinction raises a question as to the proper way in which to compare these 
sums. For the sake of simplifying the problem the federal bonus might 
be regarded as being received in one lump sum on completion of the highway, 
While the costs of administering the required advertising control system 
might be thought of as necessitating annual payments in perpetuity. 
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The purpose of this discussion is simply to examine the criticism 
which is sometimes heard that although the State stands to gain a sizable 
sum of money in the first instance, it must obligate itself thereby to 
pay out money every year forever. Some day, the argument continues, the 
state will find its bonus "used up," and yet it still must incur admin-
istrative expenses in connection with the program. Such a contention may 
or may not be valid. The key to the problem lies in an implicit assump-
tion as to the use of the funds received initially. If these funds are 
deposited in a vault, and if the annual administrative costs are paid from 
the funds in this vault, then surely a day will arrive when the funds are 
exhausted. If, on the other hand, these funds are invested at a positive 
rate of interest -- in bonds, for example -- then certainly the administra-
tive costs may be paid for a longer period of time than in the first instance; 
and if the rate of interest is sufficiently high to provide an annual in-
come at least equal to the administrative costs, then these administra-
tive costs can in fact be paid in perpetuity. 
From a realistic point of view, neither of the cases above fit the 
situation at hand. The federal bonus will not be deposited in a vault, 
nor will it be invested in bonds. However, it will be invested -- invested 
in the highway itself. Economists have a difficult enough time calculating 
the rate of return on the investment in a simple machine tool; they have 
certainly not as yet progressed in their analysis sufficiently to measure 
the productivity of a piece of social capital such as a highway. Never-
theless~ it appears that the return on dollars invested in the Interstate 
Highway System, from the public point of view, would be relatively high. 
For those want·ing something more specific it might be observed that the 
income from $1.5 million at 4 per cent per annum amounts to $60,000 per 
year. If one can accept the $1.5 million as constituting the minimum 
a!Ilount of the bonus which would be received, and if 4 per cent does not 
appear to constitute an excessive estimate of the rate of return to be 
gained on a project of this type, and if the annual administrative costs 
of the program are not expected to exceed $60,000, then the proposal 
would appear to justify undertaking on purely economic grounds. 
Costs of Administration 
The costs of aQministering a program of control of outdoor adver-
tising such as that prescribed in the National Standards is particular-
ly difficult to estimate. In an attempt to provide some meaningful indi-
cation of the cost which might be involved, a questionnaire was sent to 
the sixteen states which have already entered into agreements with the 
Secretary of Commerce regarding this matter. In addition, a question-
naire was mailed to the states of Florida and Virginia which, though 
they have not as yet entered into such agreements, nevertheless have for 
the past twenty years carried out a program of control of outdoor adver~ 
tising. The replies received have been deposited in the files of the 
Highway Department. The findings of this survey will be summarized 
briefly below. 
It must be noted that several of the states which have elected to 
accept the National Standards have not had sufficient experience under 
them to pr.ovide meaningful indications of the costs involved. A majority 
of the states, however, have chosen to establish an administrative agency 
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(usuallY within the highway department itself) whose function is to issue 
permits for the erection of signs along the highway. (Typically a fee 
averaging about $2 to $3 per sign is involved.) The advantages to such 
a system are twofold. First, this administrative agency actually per-
forms some of the enforcement function required. Since a permit is re-
quired before a sign may be erected, the agency is in a position to deter-
mine if the proposed sign conforms in all respects to the National Stand-
ards. The problem of removing non-conforming signs is thereby reduced 
considerably. Second, the fees collected by the agency for the sign per-
mits may be used to offset the costs of aQministering the program of reg-
ulation. 
An attempt was made in the survey referred to previously to ascertain 
the amount of revenues obtained from the issuance of sign permits and the 
amount of administrative costs entailed by the program. Specific questions 
were asked regarding the number of new employees required to carry out these 
functions. The replies received are difficult to summarize because differ-
ent amounts of mileage were completed and subject to control in the differ-
ent states. The general conclusion to be drawn, however, appears to be 
that the aQministrative problems are not serious ones, the cost is not 
excessive, and in several cases the revenues are approximately equal to 
the expenses involved. Frequently the administrative program was taken 
over by existing employees of the department charged with enforcement, 
and in no case did the number of additional employees required appear to 
be excessive. 
The experience of Florida and Virginia appears to be of particular 
Value in arriving at any indication of the administrative problems and 
costs involVed in the control of outdoor advertising. While neither of 
these states are presently participating in the federal program (Virginia 
is now taking the necessary steps in this direction) both have had long 
experience in this area. Florida has been regulating outdoor advertising 
along all its highways since 1941; Virginia since 1939. Thus within the 
south we find two states which could serve as a guide to the problems 
which Georgia might face in this area. 
In a communication from Mr. R. L. Nicar, Landscape Engineer for the 
Department of Highways, State of Virginia, dated October 1, 1962, it is 
revealed that this State administers controls over outdoor advertising 
along approximately 51,000 miles of highway. This is accomplished with 
the use of 24 part-time employees. The approximate direct costs of the 
p·rogram are running about $42,000 annually; the revenues received from 
fees and permits amount to about $43,300 per year. Virginia seems to 
have encountered no major problems in connection with administering its 
program of control . 
The information received from the Stats of Florida is not as complete 
as that pertaining to the experience of Virginia because of certain changes 
in the administrative organization charged with enforcing the controls. 
However in a letter from Mr. A. J. Lewis, Director, Right of Way Division, 
Florida State Road Department, dated October 12, 1962, it is stated that 
fees from licenses and permits are currently running about $160,000 annually. 
While Mr. Lewis was unable to arrive at an accurate figure regarding admin-
istrative costs, he did state that the overall costs of enforcing the con-
trols was well within the amount of revenue produced by the fees. 
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It should be noted that in both of these cases, control was exercised 
over all State-aid highways and not just the Interstate System. Both Virginia 
and Florida appear to have been able to operate their programs with no net 
drain on their State treasuries, and seem to be quite satisfied with the re-
sults. 
On the basis of the experience, such as it is, which the sixteen states 
presently operating under the National Standards have bad, and in particu-
lar in light of the success which Florida and Virginia have enjoyed under 
a similar situation for the past twenty years, there does not appear to 
be any reason to assume that administrative problems would be insurmount-
able should Georgia move to adopt the National Standards. On the contrary, 
it would seem that such a step could be undertaken in fullest confidence 
of its success. 
The adoption of the National Standards regarding outdoor advertising 
by Georgia appears to be consistent with the principle of sound fiscal 
policy on the part of the State. While the economic implications of such 
a program are but one of a number of factors which must be brought to 
bear in arriving at a final decision in this matter, it seems reasonable 
under the circumstances to conclude that these economic considerations 
do not, at least, militate against such a step. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
aeneral Recommendation 
In the 1961 session of the legislature, House Bill 155 was proposed. 
ThiS bill was intended to enable the State of Georgia to enter into an agree-
ment with the United States Department of Commerce to adopt billboard controls 
on the Georgia portion of the Interstate Highway System. At a _public hearing 
on this bill, the views of the State Highway Board were placed in the record. 
The statement of the Board said in part: 
"The growing use of signs and billboards, and a realization of 
the extent to which they could obscure the landscape, and draw 
away from the road the attention of drivers of vehicles, has caused 
many officials in the Georgia Highway Department and in the various 
highway departments of the country to favor, and move toward, more 
controls being set up to hold back or to curtail the display of 
advertising on private lands, under the view of users of the high-
ways, to reduce hazards in driving and to free up for the traveller 
the enjoyment of natural tree and plant growth, and topographic 
features along the way, that would be pleasing and restful to the 
eye 
11Present Federal provisions for bonus payments on account of 
effective advertising controls on the Interstate System require that 
agreements must be entered into between the states and the Secretary 
of Commerce before June 30, 1961. There is now no possibility of 
Georgia accomplishing an agreement by that time. However, there is 
a powerful demand from among the State Highway Departments, the 
nation's garden and other clubs, to have an extension for at least 
two years included in the currently being considered Federal-Aid 
Act of 1961, before Congress now. 
"If this requested extension to June 30, 1963, or any other 
date, should be authorized by Congress, this Board is anxious to be 
in position to proceed with efforts to qualify for the extra funds, 
but is just as anxious to see that any feasible controls of all 
advertising along any of the highways under its jurisdiction may be 
instituted. 
"The Highway Department and the Highway Board feel that this 
matter of billboard control along highways has sufficient potential 
for preserving and protecting the safety and welfare of the people 
of this State that, whether there is any Federal bonus such as 
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proposed on the Interstate system or not, these controls should be 
made effective along all State-Aid roads by state action, a~d a study 
of the possibilities for such legislative action as needed for this 
purpose is recommended to your Committee for your favorable consid-
eration."l35 
It is evident from this statement that the Highway Board does not consider 
the bonus provided for in the Highway Act of 1958 to be the sole reason, or 
even the important reason, for the adoption of some type of protection of 
Georgia highways. This thinking is sound. While an amount upwards of 
$1.5 million in savings to Georgia taxpayers is not unimportant, one-half of 
one per cent of the cost of the Interstate System is hardly a dramatic incen-
tive for making a commitment in perpetuity to a sizeable program of control. 
Undoubtedly Congress did not intend the bonus to be a bribe but rather a financial 
reward to assist and encourage the states in undertaking a program that stands 
on its own merits. 
The survey of state practices presented earlier in this report makes it 
clear that billboard control has been developing in this country for a long 
period of time. As of the present date Georgia, compared to some other 
states, has still provided for only a minimum of regulation. The Interstate 
System is a special type of highway. For this unique network, at least, some-
thing more positive is recommended. An impressive list of expert witnesses, 
members of Southeastern chapters of professional planning societies and architec-
tural institutes, testified at the public hearing on House Bill 155 in favor 
of adoption of the National Standards. 136 
It would be possible for Georgia to originate its own advertising rules 
for the Interstate System within its borders -- something other than those 
prepared, at the direction of Congress, by the United States Department of Commerce. 
Serious consideration was given to this alternative during the preparation 
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of this report. But the national character of the Interstat e Syst em suggests 
that a degree of consistency in policy through the voluntary coll aboration 
of -state governments is desirable. Such cooperation among autonomous governmen~ 
tal units regarding matters of common interest is not n ew o Indeed the continuity 
of the Interstate System itself would not have been poss i ble unl ess the separ a te 
states had agreed to abide by uniform stardards in its layout and con structiono 
The adoption of a common policy with regard to outdoor advertising s impl y ex= 
tends t his cooperation to land adjacent to . the Systemo 
The whole matter of billboard regulation is something about whi ch honest 
men differ. The decision to regulate or not is ul timately a po l i tical decision 
to be made in the political forum. But the writers of this r eport f eel that 
if the collective and historic experience of the state s with r egar d to the 
modern highway has any lesson to communicate, it is that reasonable protection 
of the people's investment from excessive placement of billboar ds is both a 
feasible and a sound policy. With specific reference to the t a sk as s i gned t o 
this research project, the feasibility of regulation along the Interstate Highway 
System in Georgia, we feel that the Nati.onal St andards , based on a plan of 
voluntary state-federal cooperation, represent as r easonable a program of con= 
trol as is possible in a situation where sharply conflicting interes ts exist . 
It is a program not beyond the limitations of practical admini stration and a 
plan to adopt and implement it is worthy of t he support of the State Hi ghway 
Depart mento This report formally makes this recommendat i ono With r egard t o 
billboards it is particularly true that prevention i s the best pol i cy o On 
July l of this year only about 12 per cent of the Inter state System i n Geor gia 
was open to traffic. The administrative probl em would be greatly s i mplified 
if act ion were taken now before numerous advert i s ing di splays are pl a ced on the 
Interstate System. 
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General Legal Procedure 
~ report does not recommend that the State follow ~ plan of purchasing 
advertising rights from ··abutting landowners. The various states were asked in -
1956 by the Bureau of Public Roads to estimate the cost of purchasing advertis-
ing rights along the Interstate. The average cost as estimated by the states 
is $7,500 a mile. _137 The cost of such easements vary from state to state and 
within areas of a given state; further the estimates are, from lack of experienceJ 
quite crude. Assuming, however, that this figure has some validity for Georgia, 
cost of easements for 1,108 miles of highway would total $8,310,000. The High-
way Act of 195H allows for sharing of this cost on a 90-10 basiso The cost to 
Georgia would be, therefore, $831,0000 
In addition to this there would be administrative costo While it is impos-
sible to estimate the amount involved accurately, it is clear that it would 
be high" especially for those segments of the .. Highway where the right..,.of-way 
has already been acquired and negotiations for advertising rights would have to 
be reopened. In addition to the cost involved, the increased volume of legal and 
administrative work necessary makes it practical to avoid this approach if at all 
possible. Of the sixteen states that have adopted the National Standards, only 
six have chosen to use the power of eminent domain and to purchase easementso 
The approach that we recommend should be used in Georgia is to base the 
legislation on the police power. While there can be no certainty in this matter, 
it is quite possible that the Georgia courts will uphold billboard legislation 
enacted to promote the safety of the traveller, to maintain the economic values 
of the State, and to preserve the general beauty of the highway. At the · .same 
time the likelihood of a statute's holding up against litigation would be con"" 
siderably increased if it were backed up by a constitutional amendment authorizing 





Laws passed by the sixteen states, and regulations prepared by the desig-
nated administrative agency pursuant thereto, mainly incorporate the detailed 
rules of the National Standards, a copy of which appears in Appendix Ao While 
there is diversity in the various laws, the essential elements are similaro A 
checklist would include the following items: statement of purpose, specifica-
tions for measurement of distance, categories of signs permitted, categories 
of' signs not permitted_, and spacing and distance provisions. Kentucky's law and 
highway department regulations serve as a typical example. A copy is repro~ 
duced in Appendix B. It should be noted . that Kentucky's regulations are some~ 
what stricter than those required by the federal government. 
The contract between the state and the United States Department of Commerce 
is completely standardized for all stateso A copy of the Connecticut contract 
appear s in Appendix C. The contract requires that the state submit a plan for 
controlling areas adjacent to Interstate Highwayso This consists of a narrative 
statement setting forth the methods and procedures t he state will follow in con-
trolling outdoor advertising and including a set of maps color coded to show the 
segments of the Interstate System considered eligible for payment of an increased 
federal share of the cost of construction and the segments not considered eligi-
ble o An example of such a narrative statement, Delaware's, appears in Appendix 
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In addition to the regulations required by the federal law, this report 
recommends that the following detailed provisions be included in a highway bill: 
Delegation of Administration to the Highway Departmento A specific agency 
should be designated. The Highway Department is the logical oneo This is typi-· 
cal for states that have adopted the plan. To the degree possible, some flexibility 
of administration should be provided for so that the Highway Department does not 
have to go to the legisl a ture every time a slight change in administrative detail 
is de s i r e do Care has to be exercised, however, that proper guidelines for admin-
istrat ion are detailed in the law to prevent the question of improper delegation 
from arising. An example of providing for flexibility in aQminfutration appears 
i n the recommendation below with regard to fees charged for permits . 
Delegation of Authority to Enter Into an Agreement With the Secretary of 
Commerce . Thi s is self-explanatory. 
Requirement of Permitso Permits to erect outdoor signs should be X:~quired. 
A separate permit should be demanded for each sign. It should not be transfer-
able . All permits should expire and be subject to renewal annually on a speci-
fie date o The fee charged should not be prorated in those cases where a permit 
will expire before twelve months have elapsed. The permit form used by Wisconsin 
is included as a sample in Appendix E . 
A.rnount of the Fee. A survey of the states shows a diversity of practice s 
i n this matter . A fee of $ 3. 00 is thought to be adequate to cover administra-
tive costs in Georgia. However, since this is a rough est imate not based on ac~ 
tual exper i enceJ i t would be better if t he law authorized the Highway Department 
to set the amount at a level suffi ci ent to cover costs. If experience showed 
$3000 to be inadequate, t he fee could eas]ly be changed. 
Rule For Allocat i on of Limited Advertising Spaces. In order that as equitaC'O 
ble a method of allocating spaces as possible be used, this report recommends 
that a procedure simil ar to the following be included in the bill: 
Applications for available Class 3 and Class 4 sign sites, where the 
number of applications shall exceed the available sitesj shall be 
awarded upon the fol l owing basis: 
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A. Agencies of the State of Georgia in order of the-ir applications. 
B. Counties or incorporated cities in the order of their applications. 
C. Federal agencies in the order of their applications. 
D. All other applicants in the order of their applications, giving 
preference, however, to the holder of any existing permit for re-
·newal ·thereof.'. Applicati-ons received du.Tin:g the Highway ··Depart-
ment's normal office hours during the same day shall be construed 
as having been received simultaneously. In case of a tie between 
applicants, and upon notification thereof by the Highway Depart-
ment, the Highway Department shall determine by lot which shall 
receive the permit. 
Tagging of Signs. The holders of permits should be required to attach to 
the sign a tag provided by the Highway Department containing the permit number, 
the date of expiration, and the name of the person or firm holding the permit. 
Sign Removal Provisions. Signs erected in violation of the regulations 
should be subject t ·o removal at the expense of the offender 30 days after written 
notification. Law enforcement officers and Highway Department employees should 
have authority to enter private property for the purpose of inspecting signs. 
Penalties. A fine for violation of the regulations should be specified. 
As stated above the median fine imposed by states who have adopted the National 
Standards is approximately in the range of not less than $25 nor more than $500. 
Extension of the Standards to All Controlled-Access Highways. The few miles 
of controlled-access highway not classified as Interstate should be included as 
subject to the same regulations. 
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TITLE 23-HIGHWAYS 
Chapter 1·-Bureou of Public Roods, 
Department of Commerce 
PART 20-NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR REGU-
LATION BY STATES OF OUTDOOR ADVER-
TISING SIGNS, DISPLAYS AND DEVICES 
ADJACENT TO THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF 




20.3 Measurements of di~tance. 
20.4 Signs that may not be pern:itted in 
protected areas. 
20.5 Signs that may be permitted in pro-
tected areas. 
20.6 Class 3 and 4 signs within in!orma-
tional sites. 
20.7 Class 3 and 4 signs outside informa-
tional sites. 
20.8 General provisions. 
20.9 Exclusions. 
20.10 State regulations. 
AUTHORITY: § § 20.1 to 20.10 issued under 
sec. 131, 72 Stat. 904; 23 U. S. C. 131. 
§ 20.1 Purpose. (a) In Title 23, 
United States Code, section 131, herein-
after called the "act", the Congress has 
declared that: 
<D To promote the safety, conven-
ience, and. enjoyment of public travel 
and the free fiow of interstate commerce 
and to protect the public investment in 
the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways, hereinafter called 
the "Interstate System", it is in the pub-
lic interest to encourage and assist the 
States to contror the u.se of and to im-
prove areas adjacent to such system by 
controlling the erection and mainte-
nance of outdoor advertising signs, dis-
plays and devices adjacent to that sys-
tem. 
· <2> It is a national policy that the 
erection and maintenance of outdoor ad-
vertising signs, displays, or devices within 
six hundred and sixty feet of the edge 
of the right-of-way and visible from the 
main-traveled way of all portions of the 
Interstate System constructed upon any 
part of right-of-way, the entire width of 
which is acquired subsequent to July 1, 
1956, should be regulated, consistent with 
national standards to be prepared and 
promulgated by the Secretary of Com-
merce. 
<b) The standards in this part are 
hereby promulgated as provided in the 
act. 
§ 20.2 Definitions. The following 
terms when used in the standardS in this 
part have the following meanings: 
(a) "Acquired for right-of-way'" 
means acquired for right-of-way for any 
public road by the Federal Government, 
a State, or a county, city or other politi-
cal subdivision of a State, by donation, 
dedication, purchase, condemnation, use, 
or otherwise. The date of acquisition 
shall be the date upon which title 
<whether fee title or a lesser interest> 
vested in the public for right-of-way 
purposes under applicable Federal or 
State law. 
<b> "Centerline of the highway" 
means a line equidistant from the edges 
of the median separating the main-
traveled ways of a divided Interstate 
highway, or the centerline of the main-
traveled way of a non-divided Interstate 
highway. 
<c> "Controlled portion of the Inter-
state System" means any portion which 
( 1) Is constructed upon any part of 
right-of-way, the entire width of which 
is acquired for right-of-way subsequent 
to July 1, 1956 <a portion shall be deemed 
so constructed if, within such portion, no 
line normal or perpendicular to the cen-
terline of the highway and extending to 
both edges of the right-of-way will inter-
sect any right-of-way acquired for right-
of-way on or before July 1, 1956) ; 
(2) Lies within a State, the highway 
department of which has entered into 
an agreement with the Secretary of 
Commerce as provided in the act; and 
(3) Is not excluded under the terms 
of the act which provide that a{:reements 
entered into between the Secretary of 
Commerce and the State highway de-
partment shall not a:pply to those seg-
ments of the Interstate System which 
traverse commercial or industrial zones 
within the boundaries of incorporated 
municipalities, as such boundaries ex-
isted on September 21, 1959, wherein the 
use of real property adjacent to the 
Interstate System is subject to municipal 
regulation or control, or which traverse 
other areas where the land use as of 
September 21, 1959, was clearly estab-
lished by· State law as industrial or-
commercial. 1 
<d> "Entrance roadway" means any 
public road or turning roadway, includ-
ing acceleration lanes, by which traffic 
may enter the main-traveled way of an 
Interstate highway from the general 
road system within a State, irrespective 
of whether tratnc may also leave the 
main-traveled way by such road or turn-
ing roadway. 
1 ti'fective date Jaznary 12. 1q6o 
II 
<e> "Erect" means to construct, build, 
raise, assemble, place, affix, attach, 
create, paint, draw, or in any othe-r way 
bring into being or establish, 
<f> AExit roadway·• means any pub-
lic road or turning roadway, including 
deceleration lanes, by which traffic may 
leave the main-traveled way of an Inter-
state highway to reach the general 
road system within a State, irrespective 
of whether traffic may also enter the 
main-traveled way by such road or turn-
ing roadway. 
(g) "Informational site" means an 
area or site established and maintained 
within or adjacent to the right-of-way cf 
a highway on the Interstate System by or 
under the supervision or control of a 
State highway department. wherein pan-
els for the display of advertising anc 
informational signs may be erected and 
maintained. 
(h) "Legible" means capable of being 
read without visual aid by a person cf 
normal visual acuity. 
<D "Maintain" means to allow tc 
exist. 
(j) "Main-traveled way" means the 
traveled way of an Interstate highway on 
which through traffic is carried. In the 
case of a divided highway, the traveled 
way of each of the separated roadways 
for traffic in opposite directions is a 
main-traveled way. It does not include 
such facilities as fronta.ge roads, turn-
ing roadways, or parking areas. 
(k) "Protected areas'' means all areas 
inside the boundaries of a State which 
are adjacent to and within six hundred 
and sixty feet of the edge of the right-of-
way of all controlled portions of the 
Interstate System within that State. 
Where a controlled portion of the Inter-
state System terminates at a State 
boundary which is not perpendicular or 
normal to the centerline of the highway, 
"protected areas" also means all areas 
inside the boundary of such State which 
are within six hundred and sixty feet of 
the edge of the right-of-way of the In-
terstate highway in the adjoining State. 
<I> ''Scenic area" means any public 
park or area of particular scenic beauty 
or historical significance designated by 
or pursuant to State law as a scenic area. 
(m) "Sign" means any outdoor sign, 
display, device, figure, painting, drawing, 
message, placard, poster, billboard, or 
other thing which is designed, intended, 
or used to advertise or inform, any part 
of the advertising or informative con-
tents of which is visible from any place 
on the main-traveled way of a controlled 
portion of the Interstate System. 
<n> "State" means the District of 
Columbia and any State of the United 
States within the boundaries of which 
a portion of the Interstate System is 
located. 
<o> "State law" means a State consti-
tutional provision or statute, or an ordi-
nance . rule, or regulation enacted or 
adopted by a State age.ncy or political 
subdiY:ision of a State pursuant to State 
con~titution or statute. 
Cp 1 "'Trade name" shall include brand 
n::.me. trademark, distinctive symbol, or 
other · similar device or thing used to 
identify particular products or services. 
( q ' "Traveled way" means the por-
ticn of a roadway for the movement of 
vehicles. exclusive of shoulders. 
( r > '"Turning roadv\·ay" means a con-
necting roadway for traffic turning 
between two intersection legs of an 
in terd1an2:e. 
'.s ) ··visible" means capable of being 
seen (whether or not legible) without 
visual aid by a person of normal visual 
acuity. 
§ 20.3 Measurements ot distance. (a) 
Distance from the edge of a right-of-
way shall be measured horizontally 
along a line normal or perpendicular to 
the centerline of the highwa,y. 
<b ) All distances under § 20.7 <a) (2) 
and <b ) shall be measured along the 
centerline of the highway between two 
vertical planes which are normal or per-
pendicular to and intersect the center-
L.ne of the highway, and which pass 
through the termini of the measured 
distance. 
~ 20 .4 Signs that may not be per-
m itted in protected areas. Erection or 
maintenan~e of the following signs may 
not be permitted in protected areas: 
( a) Signs adve:·tising -activities that 
are illegal under State or Federal laws 
or regulations in effest at the location of 
such signs or at the location of such 
a.::t1vities. 
t b) Obsolete signs, 
<c .1 Signs that are not clean and in 
good repair, 
<d l Signs that are not securely affixed 
to a substantial structure. and 
<e) Signs that are not consistent \vith 
the standards in this part. 
§ 20.5 Signs that may be permitted in 
protected areas. <a) Erection or main-
tenance of the following signs may be 
permitted in protected areas: 
Class 1--<Jfficial signs. Directional or 
other official signs or notices erected and 
maintained by public offi(:ers or agr:>ncies 
pursuant to and in accordance with direc-
t:on or authorization contained in State or 
Federal law, for the purpose of carrying out 
an official duty or responsibility . 
Class 2-0n premise signs. Signs not pro-
hibited by State law which are consistent 
with the applicable provisions of this section 
and § 20.8 and which advertise the sale or 
lease of, or activities being conducted upon, 
the real property where the signs are located. 
Not more than one such sign advertising 
the sale or lease o! the same property may be 
permitted under this Class in such manner 
as to be visible to traffic proceeding in any 
one direction on any one Inter~tate highway. 
Not more th::.n one such sign, visible to 
traffic proceeding in any one direction on 
any one Interstate highway and advertising 
acti-vities being conducted upon the real 
property where the sign is located, may be 
permitted under this Class more than 50 !eet 
!rom the advertised activity. 
Cla!'s 3-Sign.s u:ithin 12 miles of adver-
tised activities. Signs not prohibited by 
St:lte law which are consistent with the ap-
p l icable provisions o! this section and§§ 20.6, 
20 .7 and 20.8 and which advertise activities 
being conducted within 12 air miles of such 
s igns . 
Class 4-Signs in the specific interest of 
tiLe trareling public. Signs authorized to be 
erected or maintained by State law which 
a re consistent with the applicable provisions 
of this section and § § 20.6, 20.7 and 20.8 and 
which are designed to gi\'e information in 
the s;Jecific interest of the traveling public. 
( b ·; A Class 2 or 3 sign, except a Class 
2 si;-n not more than 50 feet from the 
advertised activity, that displays any 
trade name which refers to or identifies 
any service rendered or product sold, 
used or otherwise handled more than 
12 air miles from such sign may not be 
permitted unless the name of the ad-
vertised activity which is within 12 air 
miles of such sign is- displayed as con-
spicuously as such trade name. 
( C) Only information about public 
places operated by Federal, State or local 
governments, natural phenomena, his-
toric sites, areas of natural scenic beauty 
or naturally suited for outdoor recrea-
t ion, and places for camping, lodging 
eating and vehicle service and repair is 
deemed to be in the specific interest of 
the traveling public. For the purposes 
of the standards in this part, a trade 
name is deemed 'to be information in the 
specific interest of the traveling public 
only if it identifies or characterizes such 
a place or identifies vehicle service, 
equipment, parts. accessories, fuels, oils 
or lubricants being offered for sale at 
such a place. Signs displaying any 
other trade name may not be permitted 
under Class 4. 
<d ) Notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph <b) of this section, Class 2 or 
Class 3 signs which also qualify as Class 
4 signs may display trade names in ac-
cordance with the provisions of para-
graph <c) of this section. 
~ 20.6 Class 3 and 4 signs within in-
formational sites. <a) Informational 
sites for the erection and maintenance 
of Class 3 and 4 a-dvertising and inlor-
ma tiona! signs may be established in 
accordance with the Regulations for the 
Administration of Federal-Aid for High-
wnys. The location and frequency of 
such sites shall be as determined by 
agreements between the Secretary of 
Commerce and the State highway 
departments. 
<b) Class 3 and 4 signs may be per-
mitted within such informational sites 
in protected areas in a manner consist-
ent with the following provisions: 
<1) No sign may be permitted which 
is not placed upon a panel. 
<2> No panel may be permitted to 
exceed 13 feet in height or 25 feet in 
length, including border and trim, but 
excluding supports. 
(3) No sign may be pe-rmitted to ex-
ceed 12 square feet in area, and nothing 
on such sign may be permitted to be 
legible from any place on the main-
traveled way or a turning roadway. 
(4) Not more than one sign concern-
ing a single activity or place may be per-
mitted within any one informational site. 
<5) Signs concerning a single activity 
or place may be permitted within more 
than one informational site, but no Class 
3 sign which does not also qualify as a 
Class 4 sign may be permitted within 
any informational site more than 12 air 
miles from the advertised activity. 
(6) No sign may be permitted which 
moves or has any animated or moving 
parts. 
<7) Illumination of panels by other 
than white lights may not be permitted. 
and no sign placed on any panel may be 
permitted to contain, include, or be illu-
minated by any other lights, or any 
flashing, intermittent, or moving lights. 
<8) No lighting may be permitted to 
be used in any way in connection with 
any panel unless it is so effectively 
shielded as to prevent beams or rays of 
light from being directed at any portion 
of the main-traveled way of the Inter-
state System, or is of such low intensity 
or brilliance as not to cause glare or to 
impair the vision of the driver of any 
motor vehicle, or to otherwise interfere 
with any driver's operation of a motor 
vehicle. 
§ 20.7 Class 3 and 4 signs outside in-
formational sites. \a) The erection or 
maintenance of the following signs may 
be permitted within protected areas, out-
side informational sites: 
< 1) Class 3 signs which are visible only 
to Interstate highway tramc not served 
by an informational site within 12 air 
miles of the advertised activity; 
<2> Class 4 signs which are more than 
12 miles from the nearest panel within 
an informational site serving Interstate 
highway tramc to which such signs are 
visible. 
<3> Signs that qualify both as Class 3 
and 4 signs may be permitted in accord-
ance with either subparagraph <1> or 
(2) of this paragraph. 
<b > The erection or maintenance of 
signs permitted under paragraph <a> of 
this section may not be permitted in any 
manner inconsistent with the following: 
< 1 > In protected areas in advance of 
an intersection of the main-traveled way 
o! an Interstate highway ana an exit 
roadway, such signs visible to Interstate 
highway traffic approaching such inter-
section may not be permitted to exceed 
the following number: 
Number of 
Distance from intersection: signs 0-2 miles ________________ 0. 
2-5 m1les ________________ 6. 
More than 5 miles ________ Average of one 
sign per mlle. 
The-specified distances shall be measured 
to the nearest point of the intersection 
of the traveled way of the exit roadway 
and the main-traveled way of the Inter-
state highway. 
<2> Subject to the other,.provisions of 
this paragraph, not more tnan two such 
signs may be permitted within any mile 
distance measured from any point, and 
no such signs may be permitted to be less 
than 1,000 feet apart. 
<3> Such signs may not be permitted 
in protected areas adjacent to any Inter-
state highway right-of-way upon any 
part of the w..idta-.of which is constructed 
an entrance or exit roadway. 
<4> Such signs visible to Interstate 
highway traffic which is approaching or 
has passed an entrance roadway may 
not be permitted in protected areas for 
1,000 feet beyond the furthest point of 
the intersection between the traveled 
way of such entrance roadway and the 
main-traveled way -of the Interstate 
highway. 
( 5 > No such signs may be permitted in 
sceuic areas. 
<6) Not ·more than one such sign ad-
vertising activities being conducted as a 
single enterprise or giving information 
about a single place may be permitted· to 
"!Je erected or maintained in such manner 
8 s to be visible to traffic moving in any 
one d.irection on any one Interstate 
higtway. 
< c > No C1ass 3 or 4 signs other than 
those permitted by this section may be 
permitted to be erected or maintained 
within protected areas, outside informa-
tional sites. 
§ 20.8 General provisions. No Class 
3 or 4 sign may be permitted to be erected 
or maintained pursuant to§ 20.7, and no 
C!n.ss 2 sign may be permitted to be 
erected or maintained, in any manner 
inconsistent with the following: 
(2.) No sign may be permitted which 
attempts or appears to attempt to direct 
the movement of traffic or which inter-
feres with, imitates or resembles any om-
cia! traffic sign, signal or device. 
(b) No sign may be P€rmitted. which 
prevents the driver of a vehicle from 
having a clear and unobstructed view of 
official signs and approaching or merging 
traffic. 
<e> No sign may be permitted which 
contains, includes. or is illuminated by 
any fiashing, intermittent or moving 
light-Or lights. 
<d> No lighting may be permitted to 
be used in any way in connection with 
any sign unless it 1s so effectively 
shielded as to prevent beams or rays of 
light from being directed at any portion 
of t.he main-traveled way of the Inter-
state System, or is of such low intensity 
or brilliance as not to cause glare or to 
impair the vision of the driver of any 
motor vehicle, or to otherwise interfere 
with any driver's operation of a motor 
vehicle. 
<e> No sign may be permitted which 
moves or has any animated or moving 
parts. 
<f> No sign may be permitted to be 
erected or mamtatned upon trees or 
painted or drawn upon rocks or other 
natural features. 
(g) No sign may be permitted to ex-
ceed 20 feet in length. width or height, 
or 150 square feet irl area. including bor-
der and trim but excluding supports, ex-
cept Class 2 signs not mQre tl\a.n 50 feet 
from, and advertising activities being 
conducted upon, the real property where 
the sign is located. 
§ 20.9 Exclusions. The stand-
ards in this part shall not apply to mark-
ers, signs and plaques in appreciation of 
sites of historical significance for the 
erection of which provisions are made in 
an agreement between a State and the 
Secretary of Commerce, as provided in 
the Act, unless ~uch agreement expressly 
makes all or any part of· the standards 
appli~8 ble. 1 
§ 20.10 State regulation!. A State 
may elect to prohibit signs permissable 
under the standards 1n this part without 
forfeiting its rights to any benefits pro-
vided for in the act. 
Dated: November 10, 1958. 
Recommended: 
B. D. TALLAMY, 
Federal Highway Administrator. 
Issued: 
SINCLADt WEEKS, 
Secretary of Commerce. 
(P. R. Doc. 58-9440; P1led., Nov. 10, 1958; 
12:43 p. m.) 
1 ~fectlve date March 26. 19fD 
A9115 U. S. CoaiD-lC 
• 
APPENDIX B. · KENTUCKY BilLBOARD LAW AND HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS 
BILLBOARD ADVERTISING LAW 
177a830 Definitions for KRS 177o830 to 177~890o As used in 
KRS 177.830 to 177.890, unless the context requires otherwise: 
(l) "Limited-access highway" means a road or highway or 
bridge constructed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 177.220 
through 177.310; 
(2) "Interstate highway" means any highway, road, titreet, 
access facility, bridge or overpass which is designated as a 
portion of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways 
as may be established by law, or as may be so designated by the 
Department of Highways in the joint construction offue system 
by the Department of Highways and the United States Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads; 
(3) "Turnpike" means any road or highway or appurtenant 
facility constructed pursuant to the provisions of KRS l77o390 
through l77a570, or pursuant to the provisions of any other 
definition of "turnpike" in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, or 
any other highway, road, parkway, bridge or street upon which a 
toll or fee is charged for the use of motor vehicular traffic; 
(4) "Advertising device" means any billboard, sign, notice, 
poster, display or other device intended to attract the attention 
of operators of motor vehicles on the highways~ and shall include 
a structure erected or used in connection with the display of 
any such device and all lighting or other attachments used in 
connection therewitho However~ it does not include directional 
or other official signs or signals erected by the state or other 
public agency having jurisdiction; 
(5) "Highway or highway"s" as used in KRS 177.830 to 177o890 
means limited access highway 9 interstate highway, or turnpike as 
defined in KRS l77 o830 to l77o890 o 
177o840 ~ill~oarjladver~isi~g_prohibited; exception. (l) 
Except as provlded in subsection (2) of this section and as 
otherwise provided in KRS l77o830 to 177.890, the erection or 
maintenance of any advertising device upon or within six hundred 
and sixty feet of the right of way of any interstate highway, 
limited-access highway or turnpike is prohibitedo ~ 
(2) Any advert1sing device in existence on March l, 1960, 
within six hundred and sixty feet of the right of way of any 
interstate highway, limi ted-·access highway or turnpike may continue 
to be maintained for a period of five years after that date, but 
may not be replaced or relocated. 
177o850 Purpose of KRS 1~830 to 177o890. The general 
purposes of KRS l77o830 to 177~0 and its specific objectives 
and standards are : 
(l) To provide for maximum visibility along interstate 
highways, limited-access highways, and turnpikes, and connecting 
roads or highways; 
(2) To prevent unreasonable distraction of operators of 
motor vehicles; 
(3) To prevent confusion with regard to traffic lights 
signs or signals or otherwise interfere with the effectivene~s 
of traffic regulations; 
(4) To preserve and enhance the natural scenic beauty or 
the aesthetic features of the aforementioned interstate highways 
limited-access highways and turnpikes, and adjacent areas; ' 
(5) To promote maximum safety~ comfort and well-being of 
the users of the said highways. 
177o860 Standards for billboard advertisi~. The Commissioner 
of Highways shall prescr1be by regulat1ons reasonable standards 
for the advertising devices hereinafter enumerated, designed to 
protect the safety of the users of the highways and otherwise to 
achieve the objectives set forth in KRS 177.850, and the erection 
and maintenance of any of the following advertising devices~ if 
they comply with such regulations, shall not be deemed a violation 
of KRS 177.830 to 177.890: 
(1) An advertising device which is to be erected or main-
tained on property for the purpose of setting forth or indicating: 
(a) The name and address of the owner, lessee or 
occupant of such property; or 
(b) The name or type of business or profession conducted 
on such property; or 
(c) Information required or authorized by law to be 
posted or displayed thereon o 
(2) An advertising device which is not visible from any 
traveled portion of the highway; 
(3) An advertising device indicating the sale or leasing 
of the ~roperty upon which it is placed; 
(4) Advertising devices which otherwise comply with the 
applicable zoning ordinances and regulations of any county or 
city, and which are to be located in a commercially or industrially 
developed area, in which the Commissioner of Highways determines, 
in exercise of his sound discretion, that the location of such 
advertising devices is compatible with the safety and convenience 
of the traveling public o 
177$870 Violations declared a public nuisanceo Any advertising 
device erected, maintained, replaced, relocated, repaired or restored 
in violation of KRS 177.830 to 177 o890 is hereby declared to be, and 
is, a public nuisance and such device may without notice be abated 
and removed by any officer or employe of the State Department of 
Highways or upon request of the commissioner by any peace officer. 
177o880 Construction of KRS 177o830 to 177o890. Nothing in 
KRS 177.830 to 177~0 shall be construed to abrogate or affect 
the provisions of any municipal ordinance, regulation or resolution 
which is more restrictive concerning advertising devices than the 
provisions of KRS 177.830 to 177 o890 or of the regulations adopted 
hereunder. 
177oB90 Agreements with United States authorizedo The 
Commissioner of Highways is hereby authorized to enter into 
agreements with the United States Secretary of Commerce for 
the purpose of carrying out the national policy of promoting 
the safety, convenience and enjoyment of public travel and 
the free flow of interstate commerce and the protection of 
the public investment in the National System of Interstate 
and Defense Highways within the Commonwealtho 
PENALTIES 
177o990 PenaltiesG (2) Any person who willfully violates 
any of the provisions of KRS 177oB30 to 177oB90 shall~ in 
addition to any other penalty herein provided, be fined not 
less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars. 
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS 
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 
PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN KRS 177.830 ET 
SEQ THE REGULATIONS CONCERNING ADVERTISING DEVICES IN 
PROXIMITY TO LIMITED ACCESS, INTERSTATE OR TURNPIKE 
HIGHWAYS AS DECLARED IN OFFICIAL ORDER NO. 63878 ARE 
HEREBY AMENDED SO AS WHEN AMENDED WILL READ AS FOLLOWS: 
OFFICIAL ORDER NO. 
RE: ADVERTISING DEVICES ON LIMITED ACCESS AND INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 
OR TURNPIKE 
Relates to: Chapter 175, Acts of 1960 (KRS 177.830 to KRS 177.990-2) 
Pursuant to authority of: KRS 177.860 
SECTION I. DEFINITIONS 
The following terms when used in these regulations shall have 
the following meanings: 
(a) "Advertising device" shall have the same meaning ascribed 
thereto by Chapter 175, Acts of 1960. (KRS 177.830-4) 
(b) "Centerline of the highway" means a line equal distance 
from the edges of the median separating the main-traveled ways of a 
divided highway, or the centerline of t4e main-traveled way of a non-
divided. 
(c) "Highway or highways" means limited access highway, 
interstate highway or turnpike, unless the context requires otherwise. 
(d) "Limited access highway" means a road or highway or 
bridge constructed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 177.220 through 
177.310. 
(e) "Turnpike" means any road or highway or appurtenant 
facility constructed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 177.390 through 
177.570, or pursuant to the provisions of any other definition "turnpike" 
in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, or any other highway, road, parkway, 




(f) "Interstate highway" means any highway, road, street, 
access facility, bridge or overpass which is designed as a portion of 
the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways as may be 
established by law, as may be so designed by the Department of High-
ways in the joint construction of the system by the Department of 
Highways and the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public 
Roads. 
(g) "Erect'' means to construct~ build, raise, assemble, place, 
affix, attach, create, paint, draw or in any way bring into being or 
establish. 
(h) "Legible" means capable of being read without visual aid 
by a person of normal visual acuity, or capable of conveying an adver~ 
tising message to a person of normal visual acuity. 
(i) "Maintain" mean:s to allm..r to exist. 
(j) "Main-traveled way" means the traveled way of a highway 
on which through traffic is carried. In the case of a divided highway, 
the traveled way of a. separated roadway for traffic in opposite 
directions is a main-traveled way. It does not include such facilities 
as frontage roads, turning roadways, or parking areas. 
(k) "Protected areas" means all areas within the boundaries 
of this Commonwealth which are adjacent to and within 660 feet of the 
edge of the right of way of all Interstate highways, limited access 
highways and turnpikes within the Commonwealth. Where such a highway 
terminates at a State boundary which is not perpendicular or normal to 
the centerline of the highways, "Protected areas" also means all areas 
inside the boundaries of the Commonwealth which are within 660 feet of 




(1) "Sign" means "advertising device" as defined in 
Chapter 175, Acts of 1960. (KRS 177.830-4). 
(m) "Traveled way" means the portion of a roadway for 
the movement of vehicles, exclusive of shoulders. 
(n) "Turning roadway" means a connecting roadway for 
traffic turning between two intersecting lanes of an interchangeo 
(o) "Visibility" means capable of being seen (whether 
or not legible without visual aid by a person of normal visual acuity). 
(p) (1) "Commercially or industrially developed area" 
means: 
(i) Any area within 100 feet of, and including, 
any area where there are located within the protected 
area at least ten (10) separate commercial or industrial 
enterprises, not one of the structures from which one of 
such enterprises is being conducted is located at a 
distance greater than 1620 feet from any other structure 
from which one of the other enterprises is being 
conducted; and 
(ii) The land use for the area described in (i) as of 
September 21, 1959 was clearly established by state law 
as industrial or cornn1ercial or the land use for such 
area was within an incorporated municipality and zoned 
for commercial and industrial use as of Septe~ber 21, 1959; 
and 
(iii) No less than ten (10) such enterprises referred 
to in (i) are, and were on March 10, 1960, located 
consistent with state and locmzoning laws and regulations. 
B.B.-2 
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(2) "Commercial or industrial enterprise" as used in this 
definition means any activity carried on for financial gain except that 
it shall not include the leasing of property for residential purposes, 
any agricultural activity or animal husbandry or the operation or 
maintenance of advertising devices~ 
SECTION II. MEASUREMENTS OF DISTANCE 
(a) Distance from the edge of a right of way shall be. 
measured horizontally along a line normal or perpendicular to the 
centerline of a highway. All longitudinal distances shall be measured 
along the centerline of the highway between two vertical planes which 
are normal or perpendicular to and intersect the centerline of the 
highway, and shall pass throu.gh the termini of the measured distance. 
(b) For the purpose of measuring distances for the com-
putation of a commercially or industrially developed area, t~10 lines 
shall be drawn perpendicular to the center line of the highway, each 
100 feet from such separate establishment within the commercially or 
indust'rially developed area as will cause the two lines to embrace the 
greatest longitudinal distance along the center line of said highway. 
All areas within the confines of said lines perpendicular to the center-
line of the highway shall be considered a part of the commercially or 
industrially developed area o 
SECTION III o §IGNS THAT ¥!1-.Y NOT BE P~RMITTED IN PROTECTED AREAS 
Erection or maintenance of the following signs may not be 
permitted in protected areas: 
(a) Signs advertising an activity that is illegal under 
State or Federal law 
(b) Obsolete signs. 
(c) Signs that: arc not clcv.n and i :.1 ~ ~c od repair. 
B .. B.-2 
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structure. 
(d) Sig11s t hat arE: Go t s ecurely affixed to a substantial 
(e) Signs cons t ructed after ~arch 1, 1960, unless other-
wise permitted under these regulations. 
(f) Signs il lumi na t ed by other than white lights, unless 
such signs are located in a c o iT' •. merei:ally or industrially developed 
area . 
(g) Signs t hat: are not consistent with the standards in this 
section. 
(h) Signs which a~tempt or appear to attempt to direct the 
movement of traffic or whic!'l i n ter fere with, imitate or resemble any 
official traffic sign, signal or dev ice. 
(i) Si.gns which prevent the driver of a vehicle from having 
a clear and unobstructed v iew of official signs .and approaching or 
merging traffic. 
(j) Signs which eontai-.:1, i nclu de, or are illuminated by any 
flashing, intermittent or moving light or lights, unless such signs are 
located i.n a conrrner.cially or industr ially developed area and otherwise 
conform to these regulations . 
(k) Si gns which us e lighting i n any way, unless it is so 
ef:t'ectively shi.elded as t o p1.~ev·e.nt be <1::us or ray s of light from being 
directed at an] portion. of the main- t r aveled way of the Interstate System 
or unless it is of sue~ l ow i ntensity ·Or brilliance as not to cause glare 
or to impair the vision of the dr iver of any ~::ot or vehicle, or to 
otherwise interfere with any driver ~s oper ation of a motor vehicle. 
( l) Signs vJhi.ch mov-e or.- h a.ve a tll}' a.n.imated or moving parts, 
unless such signs a ·L·e located :i!l. a emr.;~~er· ci.ally o r i ndustrially developed 
ar ea , and othe~"'N'i s e c o.'.£ f orm. t o tbese r· t:: g u .~ .s t i.on~;. 
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(m) Signs erected or maintained upon trees or painted or 
drawn upon rocks or other natuYal features. 
(n) Signs exceeding 1~250 square feet in area, including 
border and trim but excluding supportso 
(o) Signs not pe·rmitted by, or signs not conforming with 
local zoning or local building restrictions .. 
(p) Signs closer than 50 feet to the edge of the main-
traveled way of any Interstate or limited access highway or turnpike. 
SECTION IV. SIGNS THAT MAY BE PERMITTED IN PROTECTED AREAS. 
(a) Erection or maintenance of the following signs may be 
permitted in protected areas: 
CLASS 1 - Signs Erected Prior to March 1, 1960. 
Signs which have been erected prior to March 1, 1960, may 
continue to be maintained Ulcl.til and including March 1, 1965. There-
after, unless such signs are permitted by these regulations, they shall 
be removed. 
CLASS 2 - On Premise Signs. 
(a) Signs may be located within protected areas where such 
signs: 
(1) Are for the purpose of setti:1g forth the name or type 
of business or profe.ssion conducted on such property on 
which the sign is located; or 
(2) Post information requi·red or authorized by law to be 
posted or displayed thereon; or 
(3) Consist of an advertising device which is not legible 
from any traveled portion of the highway; or 
(4) Indicate the sale or leasing of ~ property upon which 
they are locatedo 
B.B.-2 
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(b) Except in commercially or industrially developed areas, 
no Class 2 sign shall be located off the premises upon which the 
activity advertised is being conducted unless such sign complies 
with (3) above. 
(c) No more than one such sign advertising the sale or 
lease of the same property may be permitted under this class in such 
manner as to be legible to traffic proceeding in any one direction 
on any one Interstate highway, limited access highway or turnpike. 
(d) Except in commercially or industrially developed areas, 
no Class 2 sign described in paragraph (a) (4) of this subsection 
shall exceed 20 feet in length, width or height or 150 square feet 
in area, including border and trim but excluding supports. 
(e) Except in commer-cially or industrially developed areas, 
no Class 2 sign may be located ~ore than 50 feet from the advertised 
activity unless such sign ·is not legible from any portion of the traveled 
way of an Interstate highway, limited access highway or turnpike. 
CLASS 3 - Signs in Commercially or Industrially Developed Areas. 
Signs which are located in protected areas whidh are in-
dustrially or commercially developed areas as defined in these regulations 
may be constructed and maintained if such signs otherwise comply with 
Section III of these regulations and other applicable state, county or 
city zoning ordinances or regulations. 
Signed and approved by me this 3rd day of --~A.p_r_i_l ______ , 1961. 
HENRY WARD 
COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS 
APPROVED: 
H. D. Reed, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
APPENDIX C. CONNECTICUT OUTDOOR ADVERTISING CONTROL AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
OUTOOOR ADVERTISING CONTROL 
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and concluded this 23 day of June A.D. 1961, by and 
between the State of Connecticut, acting herein by Howard s. Ives, State Highway 
Commissioner, hereinafter referred to as the State, and the United States Secretary 
of Commerce, acting herein by Rex M. Whitton, the Federal Highway Administrator, 
hereunto duly authorized, hereinafter referred to as the Administrator. 
WITNESSETH: THAT WHEREAS, in order to promote the safety, convenience 
and enjoyment of public travel and the free flow of Interstate commerce, and to 
protect the public investment in the National System of Interstate and Defense High-
ways, hereinafter referred to as the "Interstate Systemn, the State and the Admin-
istrator hereby agree as follows: 
1. Definitions: (a) The term "Federal Act" means Section 131 of Title 
2.3 U. s. Code, and any revisions or amendments thereto. 
(b) The term "State Act" means Section 1.3-102a of the 1959 Supplement 
to the General Statutes, and any revisions or amendments thereto. 
(e) The term "national standards" means the National Standards for 
Regulation by States of Outdoor Advertising Signs, Displays and Devices Adjacent to 
the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways promulgated by the Secretary 
of Commerce pursuant to the Federal Act, and in effect on the date of this agree-
ment. Said national standards, as they were published in the Federal Register on 
November 13, 1958, (23 F.R. 8793) and any revisions or amendments thereto, are hereby 
incorporated herein by reference. 
(d) Unless the context requires otherwise, the ter.ms used herein 
shall have the same meaning as in the Federal Act and the national standards. 
2. Scope of Agreement: Except as otherwise expressly set forth herein, 
this Agreement shall apply to areas adjacent to all portions of Interstate System 
highways within the State that are constructed upon any part of a right of way, the 
entire width of which has been acquired subsequent to July 1, 1956. The said areas 
(hereinafter designated "Adjacent Areas") are those within 660 feet of the edge of 
the right of way of Interstate System highways, determined in accordance with the 
national standards. 
There shall be excluded from application of the said national standards 
any segments of the Interstate System whiCh traverse commercial or industrial zones 
within the boundaries of Connecticut towns as such boundaries existed on September 
21, 1959, wherein the use of real property adjacent to the Interstate System is sub-
ject to sttnieipal regulation or control, or which traverse other areas where the 
land use, as of September 21, 1959, was clearly established by State law as indus-
trial or commercial. 
3. State's Obligation: The State hereby agrees that, in accordance with 
the terms of this Agreement, it will control or cause to be controlled the erection 
and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays and devices in Adjacent Areas 
within such State consistent with the Federal Act and the national standards. 
4. Plan for Controlling Adjacent Areas: The State further agrees that 
its control of Adjacent Areas shall, as a minimum, be in conformity with the Federal 
Act, and the national standards, and shall be carried out pursuant to the Plan. 
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5. Exceeding of Standards: Nothing contained herein shall prohibit the 
State from exercising control of outdoor advertising signs to a greater degree than 
that required or contemplated by the national standards and the Federal Act. 
6. Plan for Controlling Areas Adjacent to Interstate Highways: State has 
presented or will present a 11Plan for Controlling Areas Adjacent to Interstate High-
W'd.ys. 11 The Plan shall consist of a narrative statement setting forth the methods 
and procedures the State will follow in controlling outdoor advertising, and shall 
include a set of maps color coded to show the segments of the Interstate System con-
sidered eligible for payment of an increased Federal share of the cost of construc-
tion, and the segments which are not considered eligible. The State shall promptly 
submit to the Administrator additions to or amendments of the Plan when the selec-
tion, designation, or modification of Interstate highway routes or other reasons 
make such action necessary or desirable. The State may from time to time submit to 
the Administrator any proposals for amendment of the Plan. If approved by the 
Administrator, such additions or amendments shall became a part of the Plan. 
7. Increase of Share: The Federal share, payable on account of any pro-
ject on the Interstate System provided for by funds authorized under Section 108 of 
the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, as amended, to which the Federal Act, the 
national policy, and this agreement apply, shall be increased by one-half (1/2) of 
one (1) percentum, or any greater percentage authorized by Federal law, of the total 
cost thereof, if and when funds are appropriated and made available for such purpose, 
and such increase shall be hereinafter called the "bonus award." However, no addi-
tional cost that may be incurred in carrying out this Agreement, no cost incurred 
in connection with any segment of highway excluded from the application of the 
national standards, and no cost of any project not payable from funds authorized by 
section 108 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, as amended, shall be included 
in such total for purposes of determining the amount of such increase. 
8. The Obligation of the Federal Government: Notwithstanding any other 
prov~s~on of this Agreement, the United States shall not be required to make any 
payments hereunder unless and until Federal funds are duly appropriated in amounts 
sufficient to enable the Administrator to make payments as provided in this Agree-
ment. 
9. Pavment Upon Evidence of Compliance: Payment of the Bonus Award will 
be made by the Administrator from funds appropriated and available for such purpose 
with respect to any project upon the submission by the State to the Administrator 
of a satisfactory showing that the State has fulfilled its obligations under this 
Agreement in connection with such project, that such project is completed, and that 
State is continuing to carry out its obligations hereunder with reference to all 
other highways on the Interstate System. 
Advertising signs, displays or devices shall be removed, or caused to be 
removed, by State as follows: 
(a) No outdoor advertising sign, display or device which is incon-
sistent with the Federal Act or the national standards whall be allowed to remain 
after July 1, 1964, in areas adjacent to any segment of the Interstate System which, 
prior to July 1, 1961, either has been completed to the geometric and design stan-
dards adopted for that system, or is under contract for completion to such standards. 
(b) No outdoor advertising sign, display or device which is incon-
sistent with the Act or the national standards shall be allowed to remain in areas 
adjacent to any segment of the Interstate System after the date upon which the State 
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highway department has accepted, as completed, a contract awarded on or after 
July 1, 1961, for the completion of such segment to the geometric and design stan-
dards approved for the Interstate System. 
No part of the Bonus Award payable under the Federal Act shall be paid to 
a State highway department on account of any project until outdoor advertising in 
areas adjacent to that project complies completely with the national standards. 
10. Failure to Perform Obligations: If, after receiving payment of any 
portion of the Bonus Award the State should fail to perform its obligations or con-
tinue the same under this Agreement in connection ~nth any project, the State hereby 
agrees that, if, without good cause shown to the satisfaction of the Administrator, 
it fails to perform such obligations within 30 days after the date of mailing by the 
Administrator of written notice thereof, it will return to the Federal Government 
all payments heretofore made under this Agreement. In the event the State does not 
return all of such payments within a reasonable time, State hereby authorizes the 
Administrator to vdthhold from the State an amount equal to such payments out of any 
Federal-aid highway funds then due or that may thereafter become due to the State. 
Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, if the State fails 
to perform any obligation of this Agreement and such failure is caused by a declara-
tion of a court of competent jurisdiction or by a ruling of the Attorney General of 
said State that s~id State is without le&al authority to perform said obligation 
under this contract, then the State will not be required to return to the Federal 
Govern'!l.ent payments heretofore made under this Agreement unless and until sixty days 
have elapsed after the adjournment of the State legislative session next following 
such declaration or ruling. 
11. Re;Javment Necessitated by Change in Zoning Hithin Connecticut Towns: 
If, after receiving payment of any portion of the Bonus Award, which payment is due 
to the control of advertising by State in an area -vJithin the limits of a Connecticut 
town as those limits existed on September 21, 1959, the status ·of any portion of 
said area is changed to a commercial or industrial zone, the national policy on 
advertising control shall no longer apply to the area or portion of area the status 
of which is changed, and State hereby agrees that it will repay so much of any bonus 
award made on account of the area to which the national policy no longer applies. 
In lieu of repayment, State hereby authorizes the Aruninistrator to withhold from the 
State an amount equal to such payments out of any Federal-aid highway funds then due 
or that may thereafter become due to the State. 
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12. Effective Date: This Agreement shall become effective when executed 
only if it be signed on behalf of both the State and the Administrator prior to 
July 1, 1961. 
IN WITNESS Vn!EHEOF the State has caused this Agreement to be duly executed 
in its behalf, and the Administrator has likewise caused the same to be duly exe-
cuted in his behalf, as of the dates specified below. 
v~ITNESSES: 
Sarah Yagoobian 
Adam F. Knurek 
APPROVED AS TO FORl'~I: 
Albert L. Coles 
Attorney General 
Date: JUN 21 1961 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 
BY Howard S. Ives (SEAL) 
Howard S. Ives 
State Highway Commissioner 
Date: June 20, 1961 
UNITED STATES DEPARTivfENT OF COl•:fr:lERCE 
BUREAU OF PUBLIC ROADS 
BY R. M. vfuitton 
Federal Highway Administrator 
Date: June 23, 1961 
APPROVED BY: 
George J. Conkling 
Commissioner of Finance & Control 
Date: JUN 20 1961 
APPENDIX D. DELAWARE PLAN FOR CONTROLLlliJG OUTDOOR ADVERTISlliJG 
PLAN FOR CONTROLLING OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
IN AREAS ADJACENT TO THE NATIONAL SYSTEM 
OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS IN THE 
STATE OF DELAWARE 
Chapter 11 of Title 17 of the Delaware Code, ae 
an:ended June It;; 1 1961, was enacted by the General Aauembly 
of the State. of' Delaware for the express purpose, j.nt;.£_£...._ill!!, 
of providing a statutory basis for the Regulation o!' Outdoor 
Advet•tising in At-eaa of this State Adjacent to the lnterB'l.a~te 
System, conaiatent with the national policy declared by CongreaB 
in Section 131 of Title 23 ("Highways") of the United S ttlt(~IJ 
Code. Section 1103 of said Chapter directs th&t the 3tati~ 
Hlghway Department shall enforce the provisions of t.h€~ Chapter 
and make, publish and enforce regulations for tha prt;per contr()l 
and restriction. of Outdoor Advertising signs, dieplayt:t and de-
vicea. That Section also directs that the regulations prornul-
gated by the State Highway Department, whenever applicabl~ to 
Outdoor Advertising signs, displays and devices 1n are&a adja-
cent to the Interstate System, ehall conform to trH.~ National 
Standards for the Regulation by States of Outdoor Advertising, 
promulgated by the Department of Connnerce on November 10, 1958, 
together with any amendments or substitute standards adoptoo 
by the federal authority supervising the grant of federal aid 
for highway purposes. Section 1128 of said Chapter authorizes 
the State Highway Department to enter into agreen1ents with the 
Secretary of Commerce of the United States as provided in 
Section 131 of Title 23 ("Highways") of the United States Code 
and to take action in the name or the State of Delaware to 
comply with the terms of such agreement. 
Chapter 11 or Title 17 of the Delaware Code~ as 
amended June 1~, 1961, insof'ar as aaid Chapter relates to pro-
teoted areas as that tenn is defined in Section 1102(b) thsreot, 
:la hereby made a part ~ this Plan. A copy of said Chapt't!.r 
in attached hereto as Appendix A. 
On June 7, 1961, the State Highway T~i,&rt~nent ~~'!opted 
n r~uolution, relating to Regulations tcr the Contl .. Ol of Outdoor 
.AdvtJrtta1ng in Areas Adjacent to Highwayb ot the Il1te~·tjt£lte 
Sj"~rL~ :a within the State of Delauare. 
An excerpt from the Minutes of this J,1ectlne; of 
tblil State Highway Department relating to these r~.zp;ulatton.;~ 1a 
attached hereto as Appendix B and made a part of tl~ :l-a Plt~n . 
This resolution provides for th.e a<1m:1.nit:lt r .::.t.ion 
and anforcement or these regulations by the D1.rector. or Opera-
tions or the State Highway Department or by such oth6r peraon 
or peraona as he shall dt~s1gnate to perform theae dutieu. 
The approximate location of that po.t"tlon of the 
National System of Interstate and Defense Highways within the 
State or Delaware has been indicated on the appropriate mapa 
prepared by the State Highway Department and dated April 15~ 
196o. Prints or these mapa, ehou1ng these approximate loca-
tions or the Interstate Highways, have been color coded to in-
dicate those sections of the system that are covered by the 
terme or the agreement of which th1a Plan 1a a part. Copies 
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or these maps are attached hereto as Appendix c and made a part 
or this Plan. 
Thle Plan, upon approval by the Administrator, will 
become a part of the agreement. It is understood and agreed 
between the ~~1es hereto that the State may, from time to 
time, submit additions and amendments to this Plan. If approved 
by the Administrator such additions and/or amendments shall be 
incorporated in and become a part or the agreement~ 
The State's Plan For Controlling outdoor Advertising 
In Areas Adjacent To The National System Of Interstate And De-
fense Highways, as herein set forth, is signed for the purpose 
ot identification by the Director or Operations of the State 
Highway Department for the State of Delaware. 
APPENDIX E. WISCONSIN APPLICATION FOR PERMIT 
-------------------------------
STATE HIGHHAY CrnMISSION OF WISCONSIN 
APPUCATION FOR PERJUT FOR OU'I'DOOR ADVERTISING SIGN 
}!ATIONAI. SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS 
(Submit in Triplicate) 
The undersigned applicant hereby requests permissi'on to erect, and/or 
maintain an advertising sign v-1ithin the zone of regulation of an interstate highway 
as prescribed by Sec ., 84 , 30 of the Hisconsin Statutes ., 
SIGN IDCATION: ------
Interstate Highway No~------ ---------County; Town of---------
Along the ______ side of the highway----- miles ___ of --------
------------- in the Seco Tnv North, R 
Give precise description of location to-nearest land division line~ or property line, 
or lot and block: 
SIGN DESCRIPI'ION: Message or objects to be portrayed, color and illuminating scheme, 
and position of sign face relative to highvmy will be as indicated on the completely 
dimensioned 8~11 x 11" drawing of the sign as attached hereto. (Separate applications 
to be submitted for each sign face) 
CLASS_OF SIGN: As defined by Seco 84o30(3), Wis., Stat ,,J this application is for: 
0 On-Premise Sign (Class b) D Other (Class Cp d, or e) 
If Class (c) or (d) the- distance between sign and place advertised is __ _ 
air miles. Precise location of place advertised is 
CONSENT OF PROPERTY OWNER: 
The applicant will make his ovm arrangements for the erection and maintenance 
of the proposed sign with the landowners or tenantsQ Proof of the property owner's con-
sent is required and must be attached' to this application ~ 
PERMIT FEE: THE FEE SHALL Nar BE SURIITTED iiiTH THE APPUCATION , The successful 
applicant will be notified of the proper fee which shall be paid prior to issuance 




DO NOT WRITE BELOw·l THIS UNE 
PERHIT FOR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING SIGN 
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS 
(Applicant) 
Address 
Whereas the location described in the foregoing application i s eligible for a 
sign permit~ and the proper fee of $ having been paid, a permit for said 
sign is hereby grantedy covering the period from this date to March 31:* 19 , subject 
to the conditions of Section 84 o- 30, Wisconsin Statutes, Chapter Hy 19 of 'Wisconsin 
Administrative Code, and the following special conditions. 
1 . Sign to be placed feet of right of way line. 
2 Q Attached sign identification t~~be affixed to sign~ 
Ar:.r.-;;ss from tht;.: btrr-:t~1t2 h : c;~w:.~. ;· f-i::,r th:: (;rcctior., J":l;Jin~cnance 
or repair of the sign authoriz~~d h ·~ re ur.clcr is E:;Xprcss.y prohibiteg. 
,_Appl--,-i-ca-t,--l-. o-n--=Rc-e_c_e..,..i v-e--d~-------
Sign Area ------sq:-Ft. 
Fee Paid $ ___________ _ 
Permit and Tag No. --------------
Interstate HighHay No. ___ _ 
County ----------·---------
APPROVED: 
STATE HIGHWAY COHHISSION OF WISCONSIN 
Date 
By 
Engineer of Maintenance 
